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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

This dispute concerns the policy of immigration enforcement discretion known as Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA). In 2016, this Court affirmed, by an equally divided Court, a decision of the
Fifth Circuit holding that two related U.S. Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) discretionary enforcement
policies, including an expansion of the DACA policy, were
likely unlawful and should be enjoined. See United
States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (per curiam). In September 2017, DHS determined that the original DACA
policy was unlawful and would likely be struck down by
the courts on the same grounds as the related policies.
DHS thus instituted an orderly wind-down of the DACA
policy. The questions presented are as follows:
1. Whether DHS’s decision to wind down the DACA
policy is judicially reviewable.
2. Whether DHS’s decision to wind down the DACA
policy is lawful.

(I)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioners are Donald J. Trump, President of the
United States; William P. Barr, Attorney General of the
United States; Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Secretary
of Homeland Security; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; L. Francis Cissna, Director of U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services; Matthew T. Albence, Acting Director of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; John P. Sanders, Acting
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection;
U.S. Customs and Border Protection; and the United
States.
Respondents are Casa de Maryland; Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights; Fair Immigration Movement;
One America; Promise Arizona; Make the Road Pennsylvania; Michigan United; Arkansas United Community
Coalition; Junta for Progressive Action, Inc.; Angel Aguiluz; Estefany Rodriguez; Heymi Elvir Maldonado; Nathaly Uribe Robledo; Eliseo Mages; Jesus Eusebio Perez;
Josue Aguiluz; Missael Garcia; Jose Aguiluz; Maricruz
Abarca; Annabelle Martines Herra; Maria Joseline Cuellar Baldelomar; Brenda Moreno Martinez; Luis Aguilar;
J.M.O., a minor child; Adriana Gonzales Magos, next of
friend to J.M.O.; A.M., a minor child; Isabel Cristina Aguilar Arce, next of friend to A.M.
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In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 18-1469
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
CASA DE MARYLAND, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and other federal parties,
respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra,
1a-61a) is not yet reported but is available at 2019 WL
2147204. The memorandum opinion of the district court
(App., infra, 62a-98a) is reported at 284 F. Supp. 3d 758.
JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
May 17, 2019. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Pertinent statutory provisions are set forth in the
appendix to the petition for a writ of certiorari in DHS
(1)

2
v. Regents of the University of California, No. 18-587,
at 127a-143a (filed Nov. 5, 2018) (Regents App.).
STATEMENT

1. a. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., charges the Secretary of Homeland Security “with the administration and enforcement” of the immigration laws. 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1). Individual aliens are subject to removal if, inter alia,
“they were inadmissible at the time of entry, have been
convicted of certain crimes, or meet other criteria set
by federal law.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387,
396 (2012); see 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (2012 & Supp. V 2017);
see also 8 U.S.C. 1227(a) (2012 & Supp. V 2017). As a
practical matter, however, the federal government cannot remove every removable alien, and a “principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396.
For any alien subject to removal, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) officials must first “decide
whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396. After removal proceedings begin,
government officials may decide to grant discretionary
protection or relief from removal, such as asylum or cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A), 1229b.
And, “[a]t each stage” of the process, “the Executive has
discretion to abandon the endeavor.” Reno v. AmericanArab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483
(1999) (AADC). In making these decisions, like other
agencies exercising enforcement discretion, DHS must
engage in “a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise.” Heckler
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). Recognizing the
need for such balancing, Congress has provided that the
“Secretary [of Homeland Security] shall be responsible
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for * * * [e]stablishing national immigration enforcement policies and priorities.” 6 U.S.C. 202(5) (2012 &
Supp. V 2017).
b. In 2012, DHS announced the policy known as
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). See
Regents App. 97a-101a. Deferred action is a practice in
which the Secretary exercises discretion to notify an alien of a decision to forbear from seeking the alien’s removal for a designated period. AADC, 525 U.S. at 484.
Under DHS regulations, aliens granted deferred action
may apply for and receive work authorization for the
duration of the deferred-action grant if they establish
economic necessity. 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14). A grant of
deferred action does not confer lawful immigration status or provide any defense to removal. DHS retains discretion to revoke deferred action unilaterally, and the
alien remains removable at any time.
DACA made deferred action available to “certain
young people who were brought to this country as children.” Regents App. 97a. The INA does not provide
any exemptions or special relief from removal for such
individuals. And dating back to at least 2001, bipartisan
efforts to provide such relief legislatively had failed.1
Under the DACA policy, following successful completion of a background check and other review, an alien
would receive deferred action for a period of two years,
subject to renewal. Id. at 99a-100a. The policy made
clear that it “confer[red] no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship,” because “[o]nly

See, e.g., S. 1291, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001); S. 1545,
108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003); S. 2075, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005);
S. 2205, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007); S. 3827, 111th Cong., 2d Sess.
(2010).
1

4
the Congress, acting through its legislative authority,
can confer these rights.” Id. at 101a.
DHS explained that information provided in the
DACA request process would be protected from disclosure for the purpose of immigration enforcement proceedings unless certain criteria related to national security or public safety were satisfied, or the individual met
the requirements for a Notice to Appear. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., DHS, Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals: Frequently Asked Questions,
https://go.usa.gov/xngCd. DHS also stated, however,
that this information-sharing policy “may be modified,
superseded, or rescinded at any time without notice,”
and that it “may not be relied upon to create any right
or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law
by any party in any administrative, civil, or criminal
matter.” Ibid.
Later, in 2014, DHS created a new policy of enforcement discretion referred to as Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
(DAPA). See Regents App. 102a-110a. Through a process expressly designed to be “similar to DACA,”
DAPA made deferred action available for certain individuals who had a child who was a U.S. citizen or lawful
permanent resident. Id. at 107a; see id. at 107a-108a.
At the same time, DHS also expanded DACA by extending the deferred-action period from two to three years
and by loosening the age and residency criteria. Id. at
106a-107a.
c. Soon thereafter, Texas and 25 other States brought
suit in the Southern District of Texas to enjoin DAPA
and the expansion of DACA. The district court issued a
nationwide preliminary injunction, finding a likelihood
of success on the claim that the DAPA and expanded
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DACA memorandum was a “ ‘substantive’ rule that should
have undergone the notice-and-comment rule making
procedure” required by the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. Texas v. United States,
86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 671 (S.D. Tex. 2015); see id. at 607,
647, 664-678.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the injunction, holding
that the DAPA and expanded DACA policies likely violated both the APA and the INA. Texas v. United
States, 809 F.3d 134, 146, 170-186 (2015). The court of
appeals concluded that plaintiffs had “established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their procedural claim” that DAPA and expanded DACA were
invalidly instituted without notice and comment. Id. at
178. The court also concluded, “as an alternate and additional ground,” that the policies were substantively
contrary to law. Ibid. The court observed that the INA
contains an “intricate system of immigration classifications and employment eligibility,” and “does not grant
the Secretary discretion to grant deferred action and
lawful presence on a class-wide basis to 4.3 million otherwise removable aliens.” Id. at 184, 186 n.202. It also
noted that Congress had repeatedly declined to enact
legislation “closely resembl[ing] DACA and DAPA.”
Id. at 185.
After briefing and argument, this Court affirmed the
Fifth Circuit’s judgment by an equally divided Court,
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per
curiam), leaving the nationwide injunction in place.
d. In June 2017, Texas and other plaintiff States in
the Texas case announced their intention to amend their
complaint to challenge the original DACA policy. D. Ct.
Doc. 26-1, at 238-240 (Nov. 15, 2017). They asserted that
“[f ]or the[] same reasons that DAPA and Expanded
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DACA’s unilateral Executive Branch conferral of eligibility for lawful presence and work authorization was
unlawful, the original June 15, 2012 DACA memorandum is also unlawful.” Id. at 239.
On September 5, 2017, rather than confront litigation challenging DACA on essentially the same grounds
that had succeeded in Texas before the same court for
the DAPA and expanded DACA policies, DHS decided
to wind down DACA in an orderly fashion. Regents
App. 111a-119a. In the rescission memorandum, thenActing Secretary of Homeland Security Elaine C. Duke
explained that, “[t]aking into consideration the Supreme
Court’s and the Fifth Circuit’s rulings in the ongoing
litigation,” as well as the Attorney General’s view that
the DACA policy was unlawful and that the “potentially
imminent” challenge to DACA would “likely * * * yield
similar results” as the Texas litigation, “it is clear that
the June 15, 2012 DACA program should be terminated.” Id. at 116a-117a. The Acting Secretary accordingly announced that, “[i]n the exercise of [her] authority in establishing national immigration policies and priorities,” the original DACA memorandum was “rescind[ed].” Id. at 117a.
The rescission memorandum stated, however, that
the government “[w]ill not terminate the grants of previously issued deferred action * * * solely based on the
directives in this memorandum” for the remaining twoyear periods. Regents App. 118a. The memorandum also
explained that DHS would “provide a limited window in
which it w[ould] adjudicate certain requests for DACA.”
Id. at 117a. Specifically, DHS would “adjudicate—on an
individual, case by case basis—properly filed pending
DACA renewal requests * * * from current beneficiaries that have been accepted by the Department as of the
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date of this memorandum, and from current beneficiaries whose benefits will expire between the date of this
memorandum and March 5, 2018 that have been accepted by the Department as of October 5, 2017.” Id. at
117a-118a.
DHS has also made clear that the “informationsharing policy has not changed in any way since it was
first announced, including as a result of the Sept. 5,
2017” DACA rescission. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., DHS, Guidance on Rejected DACA Requests,
https://go.usa.gov/xPVmG; see DHS, Frequently Asked
Questions: Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA), https://go.usa.gov/xPVmE.
e. Shortly after DHS’s decision to rescind DACA,
challenges to the rescission were filed across the country, including in the Northern District of California, the
Eastern District of New York, the District of Columbia,
and, in this case, the District of Maryland. See, e.g.,
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. DHS, No. 17-cv-5211
(N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 8, 2017); NAACP v. Trump, No.
17-cv-1907 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 18, 2017); Batalla Vidal
v. Nielsen, No. 16-cv-4756 (E.D.N.Y. second amended
complaint filed Sept. 19, 2017). The plaintiffs alleged
that the termination of DACA is unlawful because it is
arbitrary and capricious under the APA; violates the
APA’s requirement for notice-and-comment rulemaking; and denies respondents equal protection and due
process. See, e.g., App., infra, 12a. The government
defended, arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims are not reviewable under the APA and that, in any event, DHS
rationally explained the decision to wind down the discretionary DACA policy, given the agency’s conclusion
that the policy is unlawful and the imminent risk of its
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being invalidated in the Texas case, and that the plaintiffs’ claims are otherwise without merit.
The first nationwide injunction soon followed. On
January 9, 2018, in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. DHS,
supra, the district court entered a preliminary injunction requiring the government to “maintain the DACA
program on a nationwide basis on the same terms and
conditions as were in effect before the rescission on
September 5, 2017,” with certain exceptions. Regents
App. 66a; see id. at 1a-70a. The court determined that,
although agency decisions “not to prosecute or initiate
enforcement actions are generally not reviewable,” the
rescission of DACA was different because it concerned
a “broad enforcement polic[y],” rather than an “ ‘individual enforcement decision,’ ” and the “main” rationale
for rescinding the prior policy was its “supposed illegality,” which the court reasoned it could assess. Id. at
27a-28a, 30a (citation omitted). The court concluded
that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in showing that
the rescission was arbitrary and capricious because, in
the court’s view, it was “based on a flawed legal premise.” Id. at 42a.
The same court largely denied the government’s
motion to dismiss three days later. Regents App. 71a90a. It declined to dismiss respondents’ arbitrary-andcapricious claim for the same reasons it granted the nationwide preliminary injunction. Id. at 72a. And the
court declined to dismiss the equal-protection claim,
concluding that respondents’ allegations “raise a plausible inference that racial animus towards Mexicans and
Latinos was a motivating factor in the decision to end
DACA.” Id. at 87a; see id. at 83a-87a. The court sua
sponte certified that order for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). Regents App. 89a.
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f. Less than a week later, the merits of the dispute
reached this Court for the first time. On January 18,
2018, the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment seeking review the Regents
court’s orders. DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No.
17-1003. The government contended that the district
court’s unprecedented order requiring DHS to maintain
a discretionary policy of non-enforcement on a nationwide basis warranted this Court’s immediate review. In
February 2018, the Court denied the government’s petition. DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 138 S. Ct.
1182. But the Court stated that its order was “without
prejudice” and it “assumed that the Court of Appeals
w[ould] proceed expeditiously to decide this case.” Ibid.
When the government’s Regents appeal remained
pending before the Ninth Circuit eight months later,
the government filed a second petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment in Regents, along with similar
petitions for writs of certiorari before judgment to the
Second and D.C. Circuits, both of which were (and are)
considering appeals of similar orders. See DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 18-587 (filed Nov. 5, 2018);
Trump v. NAACP, No. 18-588 (filed Nov. 5, 2018);
McAleenan v. Batalla Vidal, No. 18-589 (filed Nov. 5,
2018). The government explained that the petitions were
necessary for the Court to consider and resolve this important dispute during the current Term. While briefing proceeded on those petitions, the Ninth Circuit resolved the appeal in Regents, affirming the district
court’s orders. Regents Gov’t Supp. Br. App. 1a-78a.
The government filed a supplemental brief, alerting this
Court to the Ninth Circuit’s decision and suggesting
that the government’s petition in that case should be
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considered a petition for a writ of certiorari after judgment, in keeping with the Court’s practice in similar
cases. Regents Gov’t Supp. Br. 1. No other party objected to the government’s suggestion.
The government’s petitions in Regents, Batalla Vidal, and NAACP were distributed to the Court for consideration at its January 11, 2019 Conference. They
were redistributed for consideration at the Court’s January 18, 2019 Conference. No further activity has been
recorded on the dockets.
2. Meanwhile, this case proceeded in parallel in the
District of Maryland. In March 2018, the district court
granted the government’s motion for summary judgment in relevant part. App., infra, 62a-98a. Although
the court concluded that respondents’ claims were justiciable, id. at 75a-79a, it rejected on the merits each of
respondents’ challenges to DACA’s rescission, id. at
81a-97a. The court reasoned that the rescission was exempt from APA’s notice-and-comment requirements
because the rescission memorandum provides guidance
on the agency’s “exercise of discretion,” not “a rule with
the force of law.” Id. at 82a. It rejected respondents’
arbitrary-and-capricious challenge, observing that “[r]egardless of whether DACA is, in fact, lawful or unlawful,” the agency’s “belief that it was unlawful and subject to serious legal challenge is completely rational.”
Id. at 83a. And the court concluded that respondents’
allegation of discriminatory intent was “unsupported by
the record,” and that they otherwise failed to establish
a violation of equal-protection, due-process, or estoppel
principles. Id. at 93a; see id. at 84a-95a. Respondents
appealed.2
The district court also concluded that it was “theoretically possible” that the government might use information obtained from
2
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3. In June 2018, while this case was pending before
the Fourth Circuit, then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen M. Nielsen issued a memorandum in response to the district court in NAACP v. Trump, supra,
providing further explanation of DHS’s decision to rescind DACA. Regents App. 120a-126a. Secretary Nielsen concluded that “the DACA policy properly was—
and should be—rescinded, for several separate and independently sufficient reasons.” Id. at 122a. First, the
Secretary agreed that “the DACA policy was contrary
to law” and explained that “[a]ny arguable distinctions
between the DAPA and DACA policies” were “not sufficiently material” to convince her otherwise. Ibid.; see
id. at 122a-123a. Second, the Secretary reasoned that,
in any event, “[l]ike Acting Secretary Duke, [she]
lack[s] sufficient confidence in the DACA policy’s legality to continue this non-enforcement policy, whether the
courts would ultimately uphold it or not.” Id. at 123a.
She noted that “[t]here are sound reasons for a law enforcement agency to avoid discretionary policies that
are legally questionable.” Ibid. Third, the Secretary
offered several “reasons of enforcement policy to rescind the DACA policy,” regardless of whether the policy is “illegal or legally questionable.” Ibid. The Secretary also explained that, although she “do[es] not come
to these conclusions lightly,” “neither any individual’s
reliance on the expected continuation of the DACA pol-

DACA requestors in a manner inconsistent with estoppel principles,
and therefore enjoined DHS to comply with the information-sharing
policy as “first announced in 2012” pending further order from the
court. App., infra, 95a; 3/15/18 Am. Order 1; see App., infra, 95a97a. The court of appeals, however, vacated that injunction, and it
is not at issue in this petition. App., infra, 33a-35a.
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icy nor the sympathetic circumstances of DACA recipients as a class” outweigh the reasons to end the policy.
Id. at 125a. The parties addressed the implications of
Secretary Nielsen’s memorandum for this case in their
briefs to the court of appeals. See, e.g., Gov’t C.A. Br.
38-39, 41-42; Resps. C.A. Resp. & Reply Br. 16.
4. On May 17, 2019, a divided panel of the court of
appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in
part, dismissed in part, and remanded the case to the
district court. App., infra, 1a-37a.
a. The panel majority first determined, like the district court, that respondents’ claims were justiciable.
App., infra, 14a-25a. The majority acknowledged that,
under Chaney, supra, an agency’s decision whether “to
enforce the substantive law” was presumptively “committed to agency discretion by law,” 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2).
App., infra, 19a; see id. at 18a-19a. But it concluded that
the presumption was inapplicable here. Id. at 19a-23a.
Because DACA’s rescission was a “[m]ajor agency policy decision[],” rather than an exercise of enforcement
discretion “in an individual case,” the court concluded
that the rescission was “not a ‘Chaney-type enforcement
action.’ ” Id. at 19a-20a (brackets and citation omitted).
The court of appeals further concluded that Section
1252 of the INA did not require that challenges to
DACA’s rescission be raised only at the behest of an individual alien after a final order of removal. App., infra,
14a-16a. In the court’s view, the rescission of DACA
was not a “ ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders’ ” such
that Section 1252(g) would preclude review prior to a
final order of removal. Id. at 14a (quoting 8 U.S.C.
1252(g)). And it reasoned that the “ ‘zipper’ clause” in
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Section 1252(b)(9), AADC, 525 U.S. at 483—which provides that “[ j]udicial review of all questions of law and
fact * * * arising from any action taken * * * to remove an alien * * * shall be available only in judicial
review of a final order under [Section 1252],” 8 U.S.C.
1252(b)(9)—“applies only with respect to review of an
order of removal under [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)].” App.,
infra, 16a (citation omitted; brackets in original).
b. On the merits, the court of appeals agreed with
every court to have considered the issue that DACA’s
rescission did not violate the procedural requirements
in the APA. App., infra, 25a-28a. The court observed
that while the rescission removed a “mechanism under
which individuals could receive deferred action,” it did
not create any “ ‘new binding rule of substantive law’ ”
or “curtail [DHS’s] discretion to make deferred action
available on a case-by-case or ad hoc basis.” Id. at 27a28a (citation omitted). The court thus concluded that
the rescission memorandum was a “general statement[]
of policy” to which the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements “do[] not apply.” Id. at 26a (quoting 5 U.S.C.
553(b)(A)).
The court of appeals determined, however, that the
rescission was substantively arbitrary and capricious,
because DHS “failed to give a reasoned explanation for
the change in policy, particularly given the significant
reliance interests involved.” App., infra, 31a. The court
rejected DHS’s reliance on the Texas litigation as justifying the change, observing that “DACA and DAPA are
not identical.” Id. at 32a (quoting Texas, 809 F.3d at
174). It faulted DHS for not explaining “why it was
likely that the district court in the Texas litigation
would have enjoined DACA.” Ibid. And the court of
appeals criticized DHS for not “adequately account[ing]
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for the reliance interests” of individuals who would be
affected by the rescission of the policy. Id. at 33a. In a
footnote, the court refused to consider the explanation
in Secretary Nielsen’s June 22 memorandum on the
ground that the memorandum “was not part of the administrative record in this appeal.” Id. at 33a n.18.
Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the district court’s arbitrary-and-capricious ruling, vacated
DACA’s rescission in its entirety, and remanded the
matter for “further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.” App., infra, 36a.3 In light of that disposition,
the court of appeals declined to consider whether DHS’s
“conclusions about DACA’s legality [we]re substantively incorrect.” Id. at 31a n.17. It also “decline[d] to
decide whether DACA’s rescission violates the Fifth
Amendment’s due process and equal protection guarantees.” Id. at 35a. As to the constitutional claims, the
court “vacate[d] the district court’s judgment on th[o]se
issues and dismiss[ed] those claims.” Id. at 37a.
c. Judge Richardson concurred in part and dissented
in part. App., infra, 38a-61a. In his view, “the rescission
of DACA is judicially unreviewable under the APA.” Id.
at 42a. Judge Richardson explained that “[d]iscretion
in prosecutorial enforcement is deeply rooted in the
Constitution’s separation of powers.” Id. at 43a. He observed that “[i]t is normally neither appropriate nor

Because the court of appeals vacated the rescission in its entirety, should the decision take effect, it would alter the status quo
and require DHS to, among other things, accept new DACA requests in addition to renewal requests (as required by the Regents
and Batalla Vidal injunctions). Accordingly, the government intends to file a motion in the court of appeals shortly, asking the court
to stay its mandate.
3
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necessary for judges to involve themselves in the decision to bring, or not to bring, enforcement actions.” Id.
at 44a. And he concluded that DHS’s decision to rescind
the policy of enforcement discretion at issue here should
be treated no differently. See id. at 46a-49a.
Judge Richardson rejected the majority’s new “general enforcement policies” exception to these justiciability principles. App., infra, 49a. He noted that such an
exception was irreconcilable with Chaney, which itself
concerned “the FDA’s categorical decision not to take
enforcement action against a class of actors (drug manufacturers, prison administrators, and others in the
drug distribution chain)” for the use of certain lethalinjection drugs. Id. at 50a. He also reasoned that such
an exception was “untenable” as a logical matter. Id. at
51a. “Standardizing (i.e., generalizing) how agents use
their prosecutorial discretion does not alter its character.” Ibid. In fact, he reasoned, “[t]o find that discretionary enforcement decisions are unreviewable only
when inferior officers exercise single-shot” discretion
would “brush[] aside” the constitutional separation of
powers in which the responsibility for such decisions
“remains firmly at the President’s feet.” Id. at 51a-52a.
Judge Richardson determined that respondents’
constitutional claims were reviewable, App., infra, 56a
n.6, but he had “little trouble” agreeing with the district
court that they failed on the merits, id. at 56a. With
respect to due process, he reasoned that respondents
“fail[ed] to articulate a constitutionally protected life,
liberty, or property interest impacted by the rescission.” Ibid. Indeed, he noted that the DACA memorandum itself disavowed creating any rights or entitlements,
“acknowledg[ing] that such rights could be conferred
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only by ‘Congress, acting through its legislative authority.’ ” Id. at 57a (quoting Regents App. 101a). With respect to equal protection, Judge Richardson concluded
that respondents had failed to create a “plausible inference” of invidious animus on the part of the Attorney
General or Acting Secretary in “tak[ing] the official
government actions at issue,” much less the showing of
“outrageous discrimination” that would be required to
establish what in essence is a selective-prosecution
claim. Id. at 58a-59a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

In November 2018, the government filed petitions
for writs of certiorari before judgment to the Second,
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits to review decisions concluding
that the rescission of DACA either is or likely is unlawful. Six months later, those petitions remain pending
before this Court. In the meantime, by virtue of two
nationwide injunctions, the government remains obligated to keep in place a discretionary policy of nonenforcement that the Attorney General and DHS have
reasonably concluded is unlawful and that is sanctioning
an ongoing violation of federal immigration law by
nearly 700,000 aliens. That state of affairs calls for this
Court’s immediate action.
As the government has explained in its previous filings, the DACA policy is materially indistinguishable
from the related policies that the Fifth Circuit held
were contrary to federal immigration law in a decision
that four Justices of this Court voted to affirm. Consistent with that decision, DHS has decided that such a
policy should be adopted only by legislative action, not
unilateral executive action. Yet a divided panel of the
court of appeals in this case, like those earlier courts,
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concluded that DHS somehow acted arbitrarily and capriciously by relying in part on the Fifth Circuit’s decision to reach that conclusion. The court of appeals’ decision is of a piece with the related decisions pending
before this Court, and it is wrong for the reasons explained in the petition for a writ of certiorari in DHS v.
Regents of the University of California, No. 18-587
(filed Nov. 5, 2018). At a minimum, these decisions
presently warrant this Court’s plenary review. Accordingly, to facilitate the Court’s orderly consideration of
this important dispute, the government respectfully
submits that the Court should expedite consideration of
this petition, grant the government’s petition in this
case and the other pending cases before the Court’s
summer recess, and consolidate the cases for review
next Term.
A. The Questions Presented Warrant The Court’s Immediate
Review

The government’s petition in Regents explains in detail why a grant of certiorari is necessary in order to
obtain an appropriately prompt resolution of this important dispute. Regents Pet. 15-17. In February 2018,
this Court recognized the need for an “expeditious[]”
resolution of this dispute in its order denying without
prejudice the government’s petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment in DHS v. Regents of the University of California, 138 S. Ct. 1182. Now 15 months later,
the government is still being required to retain a discretionary non-enforcement policy that DHS and the Attorney General have correctly concluded is unlawful
and that sanctions the ongoing violation of federal law
by more than half a million people.
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In the meantime, the very existence of this pending
litigation (and lingering uncertainty) continues to impede efforts to enact legislation addressing the legitimate policy concerns underlying the DACA policy. See,
e.g., S.M., What the Supreme Court’s Silence on DACA
Means, The Economist, Jan. 23, 2019, https://www.
economist.com/democracy-in-america/2019/01/23/whatthe-supreme-courts-silence-on-daca-means (explaining
that the existing injunctions are frustrating legislative
negotiations); Ted Mitchell, Congress Must Act to Protect Dreamers Still Living in Legal Limbo, Fox News,
May 21, 2019, https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/tedmitchell-congress-must-act-to-protect-dreamers-stillliving-in-legal-limbo) (describing the current inability to
bring any legislation concerning DACA recipients to a
vote); Jordan Fabian, Trump Rolls Out “Pro-American”
Immigration Plan, The Hill, May 16, 2019, https://
thehill.com/homenews/administration/444092-trumprolls-out-pro-american-immigration-plan (noting that
DACA was left out of the Administration’s most recent
immigration proposal). As a result, “the political process has been pre-empted, and we have had over a year
of bitter political division that included a government
shutdown of unprecedented length.” William P. Barr,
Att’y Gen., Remarks to the American Law Institute on
Nationwide Injunctions (May 21, 2019), https://go.usa.
gov/xmGBx.
B. This Case Squarely Presents The Reviewability And The
Lawfulness Of DACA’s Rescission

Like the others pending before the Court, this case
squarely presents both of the questions presented. Respondents raise all of the principal challenges to the
lawfulness of the rescission of DACA, including that it
is arbitrary and capricious, that it should have gone
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through notice-and-comment rulemaking, and that it violates equal-protection and due-process principles. The
government moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment on all of respondents’ claims on justiciability and merits grounds. The district court rejected each of respondents’ claims on the merits. The
court of appeals passed on the justiciability issues and
rested its merits determination on essentially the same
arbitrary-and-capricious grounds on which the district
courts in Regents and in McAleenan v. Batalla Vidal,
No. 18-589 (filed Nov. 5, 2018), rested their nationwide
preliminary injunctions and the district court in Trump
v. NAACP, No. 18-588 (filed Nov. 5, 2018), based its final order of vacatur.
Moreover, although the court of appeals remanded
the case to the district court, it did so only after finally
resolving the arbitrary-and-capricious claim and “vacat[ing] as arbitrary and capricious” DACA’s rescission.
App., infra, 36a. And after declining to address the
merits of respondents’ constitutional challenges, the
court of appeals “vacate[d] the district court’s judgment
on th[o]se issues and dismiss[ed] those claims.” Id. at
37a. Because respondents pressed each of their constitutional claims in the court of appeals, they remain
free to reassert them in this Court as an alternative
ground for affirmance. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 326 (1986). A grant of certiorari to the Fourth Circuit would therefore bring before this Court the court
of appeals’ final determination of all of the relevant issues and permit the Court to address all of the relevant
claims.
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C. The Court Should Expedite Consideration Of This
Petition, Grant The Government’s Petitions Before The
Summer Recess, And Consolidate The Cases For
Consideration Next Term

To ensure an adequate vehicle for the timely and definitive resolution of this dispute, the government respectfully submits that the Court should expedite consideration of this petition to permit consideration before
the Court’s summer recess, alongside the pending petitions in Regents, Batalla Vidal, and NAACP. Those petitions have now been pending before this Court for six
months. Briefing was completed on those petitions in
early January 2019. And although each of the petitions
was filed as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment, all parties appear to agree that given the Ninth
Circuit’s intervening decision, the Regents petition is
properly treated as an ordinary petition for a writ of certiorari after judgment. Resolution of those petitions before the summer recess is critical, if the petitions are
granted, to afford the government and the multiple private and state parties involved sufficient time to coordinate on a briefing schedule and to allow appropriate time
for each side to address, and for the Court to consider
and resolve, the many important issues presented by
these cases. And expedition of this petition would allow
the Court to consider this petition at the same time.
The Court should grant the petitions in this case, Regents, and NAACP, and consolidate those cases for further review. Although respondents in this case present
the principal challenges against the rescission of DACA
and the court of appeals’ decision represents its final resolution of those issues, the court did not pass on the constitutional claims and it refused to consider the implica-
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tions of Secretary Nielsen’s June 22 memorandum before vacating DACA’s rescission. Granting the government’s petitions in Regents and NAACP would bring before this Court the Ninth Circuit’s resolution of the
equal-protection and due-process claims, and allow for
consideration of the NAACP court’s analysis of the June
22 memorandum. See Regents Gov’t Supp. Br. 7-10.
As for Batalla Vidal, as the government’s supplemental brief in Regents explained, the Court may still
wish to grant the Batalla Vidal petition to permit the
parties in those cases to participate in the Court’s consideration of the overlapping issues. See Regents Gov’t
Supp. Br. 10-11. The Court could, however, hold the
Batalla Vidal petition pending resolution of the government’s petitions in the other cases to ensure that an order vacating the nationwide injunction in Regents would
have immediate effect on the identical injunction issued
in the Batalla Vidal cases.
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CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicitor General
JOSEPH H. HUNT
Assistant Attorney
General
JEFFREY B. WALL
Deputy Solicitor General
HASHIM M. MOOPPAN
Deputy Assistant Attorney
General
JONATHAN Y. ELLIS
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
MARK B. STERN
ABBY C. WRIGHT
THOMAS PULHAM
Attorneys

MAY 2019

APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-1521
CASA DE MARYLAND; COALITION FOR HUMANE
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS (CHIRLA); FAIR IMMIGRATION
MOVEMENT (FIRM); ONE AMERICA; PROMISE ARIZONA;
MAKE THE ROAD PENNSYLVANIA; MICHIGAN UNITED;
ARKANSAS UNITED COMMUNITY COALITION; JUNTA
FOR PROGRESSIVE ACTION, INC.; ANGEL AGUILUZ;
ESTEFANY RODRIGUEZ; HEYMI ELVIR MALDONADO;
NATHALY URIBE ROBLEDO; ELISEO MAGES; JESUS
EUSEBIO PEREZ; JOSUE AGUILUZ; MISSAEL GARCIA;
JOSE AGUILUZ; MARICRUZ ABARCA; ANNABELLE
MARTINES HERRA; MARIA JOSELINE CUELLAR
BALDELOMAR; BRENDA MORENO MARTINEZ;
LUIS AGUILAR; J.M.O., A MINOR CHILD; ADRIANA
GONZALES MAGOS, NEXT OF FRIEND TO J.M.O.;
A.M., A MINOR CHILD; ISABEL CRISTINA AGUILAR
ARCE, NEXT OF FRIEND TO A.M.,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES;
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT;
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION; DONALD J.
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UNITED STATES; ELAINE C. DUKE, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS ACTING SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; L. FRANCIS CISSNA, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES; RONALD D. VITIELLO, IN HIS
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Argued: Dec. 11, 2018
Decided: May 17, 2019
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus,
Senior District Judge. (8:17-cv-02942-RWT)
Before: KING, DIAZ, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
DIAZ, Circuit Judge:
In 2012, the Secretary of Homeland Security established the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(“DACA”) policy. Under this policy, certain noncitizens who came to the United States as children could
receive deferred action—a decision forbearing their removal from the country. Hundreds of thousands of individuals, including those who appear as Plaintiffs in
these appeals, applied for and received grants of deferred action under DACA.
In 2017, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security
rescinded DACA, which prompted a flurry of lawsuits
across the country challenging the action. Plaintiffs in
these appeals (a group of individuals and organizations)
allege that the government’s decision to rescind DACA
(and its changes to policies governing the use of information provided by DACA applicants) violates the Fifth
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Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq.,
and common law principles of estoppel.
On the government’s motion for summary judgment,
the district court determined that Plaintiffs’ challenges
were subject to judicial review, that the rescission of
DACA and changes to the government’s policies on use
of DACA applicant information did not violate the APA,
that the constitutional claims were without merit, and
that DACA’s rescission did not violate principles of estoppel. The court, however, ordered the government
(on grounds of estoppel) to comply with the policies
promulgated in 2012 on the use of information provided
by DACA applicants and enjoined it from altering these
policies.
As we explain, we agree with the district court that
Plaintiffs’ challenges are subject to judicial review.
We also agree with the district court that the government’s decision to rescind DACA did not require notice
and comment under the APA. But the decision nonetheless violated the APA because—on the administrative record before us—it was not adequately explained
and thus was arbitrary and capricious. We also conclude that the district court erred in ordering the government to comply with its policies promulgated in 2012
on the use of information provided by DACA applicants
and enjoining it from altering those policies.
Given our resolution, we decline, under the doctrine
of constitutional avoidance, to decide whether Plaintiffs’
Fifth Amendment rights were violated. Nor do we address Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments challenging the
district court’s grant of summary judgment.

5a
I.
A.
Before turning to the record material, some context
is in order. The Secretary of Homeland Security is
“charged with the administration and enforcement” of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(a)(1). One of the enforcement tools available
under the INA is the removal of aliens from the United
States. “Aliens may be removed if they were inadmissible at the time of entry, have been convicted of certain
crimes, or meet other criteria set by federal law.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012); see
8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a), 1227(a) (listing classes of deportable
and inadmissible aliens).
Because of the “practical fact,” however, that the
government can’t possibly remove all such aliens, the
Secretary has discretion to prioritize the removal of
some and to deprioritize the removal of others. Arpaio
v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see 6 U.S.C.
§ 202(5) (charging the Secretary of Homeland Security
with “[e]stablishing national immigration enforcement
policies and priorities”). One form of discretion the
government exercises is deferred action, which “is a decision by Executive Branch officials not to pursue deportation proceedings against an individual or class of individuals otherwise eligible for removal from this country.” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. DHS, 908 F.3d 476,
487 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 87 U.S.L.W.
3201 (U.S. Nov. 5 & 19, 2018) (No. 18-587).
Immigration authorities have granted deferred action and related forms of relief from deportation or removal since at least the early 1960s. See id. at 487-89;
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The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to
Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. ____, 2014 WL 10788677, at *10-13
(Nov. 19, 2014) (“2014 OLC Opinion”) 1 (addressing the
Department’s practices of granting deferred action ad
hoc and through broad policies making relief from removal available to particular groups of aliens). The Supreme Court also has recognized deferred action
by name, describing it as the executive branch’s “regular practice . . . of exercising . . . discretion for
humanitarian reasons or simply for its own convenience.” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.
(“AAADC”), 525 U.S. 471, 484 (1999).
B.
Turning now to the record material, the essential
undisputed facts are as follows. To ensure government
resources were not spent on the “low priority cases” of
“certain young people who were brought to [the United
The Office of Legal Counsel, or OLC, is an office within the U.S.
Department of Justice that drafts legal opinions of the Attorney
General and provides its own written opinions and other advice in
response to requests from various agencies within the executive
branch. See 28 U.S.C. § 512 (providing that agency heads may seek
legal advice from the Attorney General); 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (delegating
Attorney General’s authority to render legal advice to OLC); “Office
of Legal Counsel,” The United States Department of Justice, https://
www.justice.gov/olc (saved as ECF opinion attachment). Although
not binding on courts, OLC opinions “reflect[] the legal position of
the executive branch” and “are generally viewed as providing binding interpretive guidance for executive agencies.” United States v.
Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 385 n.16 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
1

7a
States] as children and know only this country as home,”
J.A. 129, then Secretary of Homeland Security Janet
Napolitano announced in a June 15, 2012, memorandum
the policy that has become known as DACA. The DACA
Memo made renewable two-year terms of deferred action from removal and authorization for employment
available to individuals who came to the United States
as children, satisfied certain other eligibility criteria, 2
and passed background checks.
To be considered for deferred action under DACA,
applicants had to submit to biometric screening and provide extensive personal information to the Department
of Homeland Security. The Department informed applicants that the information provided was “protected
from disclosure . . . for the purpose of immigration
enforcement proceedings” unless the requestor met criteria for commencement of removal proceedings or referral to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
for a determination whether to commence removal proceedings.3 J.A. 1004. The Department warned, however, that these policies could be “modified, superseded,
or rescinded at any time without notice” and were “not
intended to” and did not “create any right or benefit,

In its original form, deferred action was available to individuals
who were under age 16 when they came to the United States, were
not above age 30, had continuously resided in the United States for
at least five years preceding June 15, 2012, and were present in the
country on June 15, 2012, and satisfied certain other requirements
relative to public safety and education or military service.
3
Separately, the Department noted that the information provided
could be shared with national security and law enforcement agencies
“for purposes other than removal.” J.A. 1004.
2

8a
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any
party.” Id.
The DACA Memo made clear that it “confer[red] no
substantive right, immigration status[,] or pathway to
citizenship.” J.A. 131. DACA recipients, however,
were eligible to receive a host of other benefits under
preexisting statutes and regulations, including advance
parole allowing reentry into the United States after
travel abroad, social security benefits, and certain forms
of public assistance. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(d)(5)(A),
1611(b)(1), 1621(b)(1), (d); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.3(a)(4)(vi), 212.5.
DACA recipients also were eligible to receive employment authorization on a showing of economic necessity.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14).
In November 2014, then Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson announced a separate deferred action policy for certain parents of United States citizens
and lawful permanent residents that became known as
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (“DAPA”). 4
The DAPA memorandum also expanded DACA by
(1) extending the deferred action and employment authorization terms from two to three years; (2) removing
the “age cap” that previously excluded certain individuals
from DACA eligibility; and (3) reducing the period of time
The 2014 OLC Opinion concluded that DAPA “would constitute a
permissible exercise of [the Department of Homeland Security]’s enforcement discretion under the INA.” J.A. 162; 2014 WL 10788677,
at *23. While the opinion doesn’t directly address the Department’s
authority to implement DACA, it does recount that, before DACA
was announced, the OLC had “orally advised” the Department that
the policy would be permissible “provided that immigration officials
retained discretion to evaluate each application on an individualized
basis.” J.A. 149 n.8; 2014 WL 10788677, at *13 n.8.
4
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that someone needed to be physically present in the
United States to be eligible for DACA. See J.A. 167-68.
A coalition of states led by Texas sued to block implementation of the DAPA policy (and its proposed expansions to DACA) on the grounds that it violated the APA
and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const.
art. II, § 3 (the “Texas litigation”). See Texas v. United
States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 604 & n.1, 607 (S.D. Tex.
2015). The district court in that case granted injunctive relief, id. at 671-72, 677-78 & n.111, and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed, Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134,
178-79, 186, 188 (5th Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court
affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment by an equally divided vote. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271
(2016) (per curiam).
In June 2017 (approximately five months after the
Trump administration took office), then Secretary of
Homeland Security John Kelly rescinded DAPA but left
in place DACA and the deferred action relief and employment authorizations granted between the issuance
of the DAPA Memo and the district court’s decision in
the Texas litigation.
On September 4, 2017, Attorney General Jefferson
Sessions wrote to then Acting Secretary Elaine Duke,
advising her to rescind DACA. According to the Attorney General:
DACA was effectuated by the previous administration through executive action, without proper statutory authority and with no established end-date, after Congress’ repeated rejection of proposed legislation that would have accomplished a similar result.
Such an open-ended circumvention of immigration
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laws was an unconstitutional exercise of authority by
the Executive Branch. The related . . . DAPA
. . . policy was enjoined on a nationwide basis in a
decision affirmed by the Fifth Circuit on the basis of
multiple legal grounds and then by the Supreme
Court by an equally divided vote. . . . Because
the DACA policy has the same legal and constitutional defects that the courts recognized as to DAPA,
it is likely that potentially imminent litigation would
yield similar results with respect to DACA. [5]
In light of the costs and burdens that will be imposed
on DHS associated with rescinding this policy, DHS
should consider an orderly and efficient wind-down
process.
J.A. 379 (internal citations omitted).
The next day, Acting Secretary Duke rescinded
DACA and instructed Department personnel to “winddown” the policy. J.A. 380, 383. The Secretary’s Rescission Memo recounts in a “Background” section the
DACA and DAPA policies, the Texas litigation, Secretary Kelly’s rescission of DAPA, the letter to Attorney
General Sessions from the plaintiffs in the Texas litigation, and General Sessions’s September 4 letter. The
Rescission Memo then states:
Taking into consideration the Supreme Court’s and
the Fifth Circuit’s rulings in the ongoing litigation,
and the September 4, 2017[,] letter from the Attorney
Plaintiffs in the Texas litigation had written to General Sessions
in June 2017, requesting that the Secretary of Homeland Security
rescind DACA and prohibit new grants and renewals of deferred action. The letter warned that, if the Executive Branch failed to so act,
plaintiffs there would amend their complaint to challenge DACA.
5
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General, it is clear that the June 15, 2012[,] DACA
program should be terminated.
J.A. 383.
The Rescission Memo—which issued without notice
or an opportunity for public comment—did not end
DACA outright. Rather, it allowed for a case-by-case
basis adjudication of initial applications for deferred action and employment authorization accepted by September 5, 2017, and renewal requests accepted by October
5, 2017, from current DACA beneficiaries whose benefits would expire between September 5, 2017, and March
5, 2018.
The Memo stated that the Department would not terminate existing grants of deferred action and employment authorization under DACA “solely based on the directives” in the Memo and would “generally honor” approved applications for advanced parole. Id. But it
made clear that the Department would reject all other
DACA applications, including initial applications filed
after September 5, 2017, and all pending and future applications for advance parole under DACA. Id. The
Memo, however, explicitly placed “no limitations” on the
Department’s “otherwise lawful enforcement
. . .
prerogatives.” J.A. 384.
The Department also announced that once an individual’s deferred action under DACA expired, information
provided by applicants would not be “proactively provided to [law enforcement agencies] for the purpose of
immigration enforcement proceedings” unless the requestor met criteria for commencement of removal proceedings or referral to U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement for a determination whether to commence

12a
removal proceedings. J.A. 1142. For individuals whose
pending DACA requests were denied, the announcement stated that “[g]enerally, information provided in
DACA requests will not be proactively provided to other
law enforcement entities . . . for the purpose of immigration enforcement proceedings” unless the requestor posed “a risk to national security or public safety” or
met criteria for commencement of removal proceedings
or referral to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement for a determination whether to commence removal
proceedings. J.A. 1143.
Nearly 800,000 individuals have received deferred action under DACA since its inception.
C.
Plaintiffs’ complaint raises a host of challenges to the
government’s decision to rescind DACA. First, the complaint alleges that the rescission is a substantive rule
and thus requires notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA. Next, it asserts that the government’s
decisions to rescind DACA and change the way the government proposed to share personal information collected from DACA applicants were arbitrary, capricious,
and contrary to law, in violation of the APA, and violated
the substantive and procedural due process protections
of the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs also allege that the
decision to rescind DACA violates the equal protection
guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. Finally, Plaintiffs
say that the government should be equitably estopped
from rescinding DACA or using information provided by
DACA applicants for immigration enforcement purposes beyond those first announced in 2012, when the
government’s information-sharing policies were first
implemented.
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The district court granted partial summary judgment
to the government. The court found (contrary to the
government’s contention) that Plaintiffs’ claims were
justiciable. Casa De Maryland v. DHS, 284 F. Supp.
3d 758, 768-71 (D. Md. 2018). But on the merits, the
court determined that DACA’s rescission and the government’s changes to its policies on information-sharing
did not violate the APA and that Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims lacked merit. Id. at 771-77. The court
also determined that DACA’s rescission did not violate
the doctrine of estoppel. Id. at 777-78.
The court, however, granted summary judgment to
Plaintiffs on the portion of their estoppel claim pertaining to the sharing of DACA applicant information. The
court ordered the government to comply with the policies as originally announced in 2012 and enjoined it from
altering these policies. Id. at 778-79; J.A. 1531-33.
These appeals followed. We review a district court’s
grant of summary judgment de novo. Roland v. USCIS,
850 F.3d 625, 628 (4th Cir. 2017). “We can affirm a grant
of summary judgment only where there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Cohen, 785 F.3d 886, 889-90
(4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
review a district court’s grant of an injunction for abuse
of discretion. South Carolina v. United States, 907 F.3d
742, 753 (4th Cir. 2018).
II.
We begin with the government’s argument that
Plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable, an issue we consider de novo. See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 370

14a
(4th Cir. 2014); Angelex Ltd. v. United States, 723 F.3d
500, 505 (4th Cir. 2013).
A.
The government contends that Plaintiffs’ claims are
immune from judicial review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), a
provision of the INA stating, “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any
alien arising from the decision or action by the [Secretary of Homeland Security] to commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any
alien under this chapter.”
According to the government, § 1252(g) bars review
here in two ways. First, noting that the Supreme Court
in AAADC observed that § 1252(g) “seems clearly designed to give some measure of protection to ‘no deferred action’ decisions and similar discretionary determinations,” 525 U.S. at 485,6 the government contends
that this section bars review because DACA’s rescission
is a “no deferred action” decision. But this contention
ignores both the plain language of § 1252(g) and the Supreme Court’s determination in AAADC that this section “applies only to three discrete actions that the [Secretary of Homeland Security] may take: her ‘decision
or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,
or execute removal orders.’ ” Id. at 482 (first emphasis

The Supreme Court said as much after reviewing a treatise describing the practice of deferred action and litigation that would result when it was not granted. AAADC, 525 U.S. at 484-85. That
treatise, however, referred explicitly to “[e]fforts to challenge the
refusal to exercise [deferred action] on behalf of specific aliens.”
Id. at 485 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs don’t challenge the refusal
to grant deferred action to a particular individual.
6
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added). In rescinding DACA, the Acting Secretary did
none of these things.
Second, the government says that § 1252(g) precludes review because DACA’s rescission is an initial
“action” in the commencement of removal proceedings.
As the government would have it, review of its decision
to rescind DACA must await a final order of removal.
The Supreme Court in AAADC though “specifically rejected a broad reading of the three discrete actions
listed in [§] 1252(g).” Regents, 908 F.3d at 504. Specifically, “decisions to open an investigation, [or] to surveil
the suspected violator” are not encompassed by § 1252(g)’s
jurisdictional bar, even though these decisions “may be
part of the deportation process.” AAADC, 525 U.S. at
482; see Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841
(2018) (Alito, J., plurality) (“[In AAADC, w]e did not interpret [§ 1252(g)] to sweep in any claim that can technically be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions.
. . . Instead, we read the language to refer to just
those three specific actions themselves.” (emphasis
added)).
And while we accept that § 1252(g) “is specifically directed at the deconstruction, fragmentation, and hence
prolongation of removal proceedings,” AAADC, 525 U.S.
at 487, the government hasn’t moved to remove any of
the Plaintiffs. The two Circuit decisions on which the
government relies to support the proposition that judicial review of DACA’s rescission is available only through
review of a final order of removal—Vasquez v. Aviles,
639 F. App’x 898 (3d Cir. 2016), and Botezatu v. INS,
195 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 1999)—are inapposite. Those
cases involved challenges to individual “no deferred
action” decisions by aliens adjudicated removable.
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Vasquez, 639 F. App’x at 901; Botezatu, 195 F.3d at 314.
The government’s reliance on AAADC is therefore misplaced, and we reject its argument that § 1252(g) bars review of Plaintiffs’ claims. 7
B.
The government argues that another provision of the
INA—8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)—bars review of Plaintiffs’
claims. The government did not press this argument
in the district court. But because a party may challenge subject matter jurisdiction for the first time on
appeal, Am. Canoe Ass’n, Inc. v. Murphy Farms, Inc.,
326 F.3d 505, 515 (4th Cir. 2003), we consider this issue.
Section 1252(b)(9) provides that “[ j]udicial review of
all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien
from the United States under this subchapter shall be
available only in judicial review of a final order under
this section.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). But that provision
doesn’t help the government here because it “applies
only with respect to review of an order of removal under
[8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)].” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
Accord Regents, 908 F.3d at 504 (holding § 1252(g) doesn’t deprive courts of jurisdiction to review DACA’s rescission); NAACP v.
Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 224 (D.D.C. 2018) (rejecting as “misplaced” government’s reliance on AAADC and finding § 1252(g)
didn’t bar review of challenges to DACA’s rescission), appeals docketed, Nos. 18-5243, 18-5245 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10 & 13, 2018), petition
for cert. before judgment filed, 87 U.S.L.W. 3204 (U.S. Nov. 5, 2018)
(No. 18-588); Batalla Vidal v. Duke, 295 F. Supp. 3d 127, 152-54
(E.D.N.Y. 2017) (rejecting government’s § 1252(g) argument in challenge to DACA’s rescission), appeals docketed, Nos. 18-1985, 18-1986
(2d Cir. July 5, 2018), petition for cert. before judgment filed,
87 U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Nov. 5, 2018) (No. 18-589).
7
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313 (2001) (emphases added; internal quotation marks
and alteration omitted); see Calcano-Martinez v. INS,
232 F.3d 328, 340 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Congress enacted
[§ 1252(b)(9)] for the important purpose of consolidating
all claims that may be brought in removal proceedings
into one final petition for review of a final order in the
court of appeals.” (emphasis added)), aff ’d, 533 U.S.
348 (2001).
The government’s contention that § 1252(b)(9) bars
review thus is without merit.
C.
Next, the government contends that judicial review
is foreclosed under the APA because the decision to rescind DACA is committed to agency discretion by law.
We do not agree.
“Although there is a ‘strong presumption’ in favor of
judicial review of agency action,” Speed Mining, Inc. v.
Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 528 F.3d
310, 316 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad.
of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)), the
APA bars judicial review of agency action “committed to
agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). The
government says that the Acting Secretary’s decision to
rescind DACA is a type of agency enforcement decision
that is presumptively unreviewable under the Supreme
Court’s decision in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821
(1985). 8 Invoking the “broad discretion exercised by

The government doesn’t appear to seriously contest that Plaintiffs’ procedural APA claim challenging the decision to rescind
DACA is subject to judicial review. Accord Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S.
182, 195-98 (1993) (process by which an agency makes a rule may be
8
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immigration officials” that is a “principal feature of the
removal system,” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396, the government urges that the concerns driving Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability apply with “particular force”
in the removal context, a context in which allowing delay
would result in ordering the government to allow a “continuing violation” of federal law, AAADC, 525 U.S. at 490.
And while conceding that an agency’s expression of a
legal interpretation announced in a broad or general enforcement policy may be reviewable, the government
says that the decision to rescind DACA is distinguishable because it rested on discretionary enforcement concerns and expressed the Department of Homeland Security’s view about the scope of its enforcement authority, not the substantive unlawfulness of the policy. Finally, relying on the Supreme Court’s post-Chaney decision in ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs (“BLE”),
482 U.S. 270 (1987), the government argues that, even if
the sole rationale for the rescission decision was the
view that DACA was unlawful, such rationale cannot
provide a “hook” to support review of the decision.
Because the government relies so heavily on Chaney
for its argument, we turn to that decision. There, a
group of death row inmates petitioned the Food and
Drug Administration to prevent the use in lethal injections of certain drugs that the agency had not approved
for that purpose. 470 U.S. at 823-24. The agency refused to act, based on its view that its jurisdiction to act
under the substantive law was unclear and, even if it had
jurisdiction, it would decline to exercise that jurisdiction
reviewed for compliance with applicable procedural requirements,
regardless of reviewability of the substance of the rule).
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under its inherent discretion to do so. Id. at 824-25.
The petitioners filed suit, seeking an order directing the
agency to act. Id. at 825.
Without addressing the jurisdictional issue, the
Court held that the agency’s discretionary decision not
to enforce the substantive law was unreviewable under
the APA. Id. at 828, 837-38. As the Court explained,
such decisions “often involve[] a complicated balancing
of a number of factors which are peculiarly within [the
agency’s] expertise,” including “whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another,
whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, [and]
whether the particular enforcement action . . . best
fits the agency’s overall policies.” Id. at 831.
Nonenforcement decisions, the Court observed, generally do not involve the exercise of “coercive power over
an individual’s liberty or property rights,” and, accordingly, do “not infringe upon areas that courts often are
called upon to protect.” Id. at 832. Such decisions
also “share[] to some extent the characteristics of the
decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to
indict—a decision which has long been regarded as the
special province of the Executive Branch.” Id. For
these reasons, the Court found, such decisions have
“traditionally been committed to agency discretion,”
and Congress, in “enacting the APA[,] did not intend to
alter that tradition.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, the Court concluded, “an agency’s decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed
immune from judicial review under § 701(a)(2).” Id.
Here, however, the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to rescind DACA is not a “Chaney-type
enforcement action[].” Kenney v. Glickman, 96 F.3d
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1118, 1123 (8th Cir. 1996). For starters, the Acting
Secretary did not exercise her discretion in an individual
case.9 Nor did she identify a violation of the INA against
which to act, determine whether government resources
would be best spent enforcing one violation over another, or decide whether the Department would succeed
if it pursued a particular violation. Rather, Acting Secretary Duke rescinded a general enforcement policy in
existence for over five years and affecting hundreds of
thousands of enrollees based on the view that the policy
was unlawful.
Major agency policy decisions are “quite different
from day-to-day agency []enforcement decisions.” Nat’l
Treasury Emps. Union v. Horner, 854 F.2d 490, 496
(D.C. Cir. 1988). Where an agency expresses a broad
or general enforcement policy, different considerations
than those driving Chaney’s presumption are at play.
“As general statements, they are more likely to be direct
interpretations of the commands of the substantive statute rather than the sort of mingled assessments of fact,
policy, and law that drive an individual enforcement decision and that are, as Chaney recognizes, peculiarly
within the agency’s expertise and discretion.” Crowley
Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 677
(D.C. Cir. 1994).

The government correctly observes that an agency’s discretionary decision to enforce the law may be unreviewable under § 701(a)(2).
See Speed Mining, 528 F.3d at 311, 317-18 (holding agency’s discretionary decision to enforce substantive law by issuing citations for
safety violations was committed to agency discretion and therefore
unreviewable). But Speed Mining is distinguishable because it involved a discretionary enforcement decision in an individual case.
9
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Accordingly, as courts have recognized, an agency’s
expression of a broad or general enforcement policy
based on the agency’s legal interpretation is subject
to review. OSG Bulk Ships, Inc. v. United States,
132 F.3d 808, 811-12 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding courts had
jurisdiction under APA because challenged agency action was a general policy of refusing to enforce provision
of substantive law and not a “single-shot non-enforcement
decision” (citing Crowley, 37 F.3d at 674-76)); see Kenney, 96 F.3d at 1123-24 (concluding Chaney applies to
“individual, case-by-base determinations of when to enforce existing [law] rather than permanent policies or
standards” and did not encompass agency’s adoption of
general policies stating standards agency deemed acceptable to implement statutory goals); Crowley, 37 F.3d
at 672-73, 675 (Chaney’s presumption applies if “agency
bases its refusal to enforce in an individual case solely
on a legal interpretation without explicitly relying on its
enforcement discretion”); see also Edison Elec. Inst. v.
EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding challenge to agency’s interpretation of law and regulations
advanced in enforcement policy statement was “not the
type of discretionary judgment concerning the allocation of enforcement resources that [Chaney] shields
from judicial review”); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA,
980 F.2d 765, 767, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding Chaney’s
presumption “is inapplicable or at least rebutted [where
plaintiff ] raise[d] a facial challenge to the [agency’s]
statutory interpretation embodied in [a regulation] and
d[id] not contest a particular enforcement decision” and

22a
citing authority in support).
within this rubric. 10

DACA’s rescission fits well

The government attempts to distinguish this authority, but its efforts are unavailing. It claims DACA’s rescission involved discretionary balancing because it was
based on concerns about its legality and “litigation risk,”
a term that appears to refer to the likelihood the policy
would have been invalidated had it been challenged in
the Texas litigation. But the Rescission Memo doesn’t
identify the “risk” of litigation as a “consideration” on
which the Acting Secretary relied in rescinding the policy. Rather, the Memo relies on the Attorney General’s conclusion that DACA needed to be rescinded because it was unlawful. 11 True, the Attorney General’s
letter also proffers the conclusion that “potentially imminent litigation” would invalidate DACA, as was the
case with DAPA in the Texas litigation. But we agree
with the determination of our district court colleague
Judge Bates in his opinion resolving challenges to
DACA’s rescission that this justification “was too closely
bound up with [the Attorney General’s] evaluation of
DACA’s legality,” NAACP, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 234, and
Our dissenting colleague contends that decisions from the D.C.
Circuit supporting our view that DACA’s rescission is reviewable
don’t explain how they can be reconciled with Chaney. Dis. op. at
48-51. We disagree. See Crowley, 37 F.3d at 675-77; Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 980 F.2d at 772-73.
11
See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (“[D]etermination[s] and ruling[s] by
the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be
controlling [on the Secretary of Homeland Security].”); see YanezMarquez v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434, 450 n.6 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding Attorney General’s position controlling where Department of Homeland Security and Attorney General had conflicting views about applicability of a legal doctrine).
10
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thus cuts against Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability.
Nor are we persuaded by the government’s claim
that DACA’s rescission rested on the Department’s view
of the scope of its enforcement authority, not the substantive unlawfulness of the policy. As Judge Bates
aptly noted when presented with the same argument,
“this strikes the [c]ourt as a distinction without a difference. To say that a particular agency action is ‘without
statutory authority’ is simply to say that no statutory
provision authorizes that action; in a sense, therefore, it
is a determination of the substantive content of each
statutory provision that might plausibly apply.” Id. at
232. We, like Judge Bates, “fail[] to perceive any meaningful difference between an agency’s conclusion that it
lacks statutory authority and its interpretation of a specific statutory provision.” Id.12

Our dissenting colleague notes that Acting Secretary Duke
didn’t say in the Rescission Memo “that DACA must be terminated
or that she lacked the legal authority to enforce DACA or a DACAlike program.” Dis. op. at 54. It is true that Acting Secretary Duke
wrote only that it was clear DACA “should” be terminated. J.A.
383. Standing alone, however, “should” can express the notion of
requirement or obligation. Should, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged (2002) (“used . . . to express duty,
obligation, [or] necessity”). Given the Attorney General’s evaluation of DACA’s legality and the absence of any reference to litigation
risk in the Rescission Memo’s list of considerations, this use of the
word “should” supports our conclusion, ante, at 20, 22, that the Secretary rescinded DACA based on her view that the policy was unlawful. Contrary to our dissenting colleague’s view, our decision
today does not intrude on discretionary prerogatives of the Executive Branch (see Dis. op. at 50-52); rather, it “preserves the judiciary’s role as the ultimate arbiter of statutory meaning while at the
12
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The government also relies on the Supreme Court’s
decision in BLE as further support for the view that
Plaintiffs’ claims are unreviewable. But there, the Supreme Court held only that “where a party petitions an
agency for reconsideration on the ground of material error, i.e., on the same record that was before the agency
when it rendered its original decision, an order which
merely denies rehearing of the prior order is not itself
reviewable.” 482 U.S. at 280 (internal quotation marks,
ellipsis, and alteration omitted). The government is
correct that the Court also rejected the principle that, if
an “agency gives a ‘reviewable’ reason for otherwise unreviewable action, the action becomes reviewable,” citing as an example a prosecutor’s refusal to institute criminal proceedings based on the belief that the law will not
sustain a conviction. Id. at 283. But BLE still does
not advance the government’s argument.
For one thing, Plaintiffs here filed a timely challenge
to the government’s original decision to rescind DACA.
BLE doesn’t bar review of that type of challenge. Moreover, as the government itself concedes, Appellees’ Opening & Response Br. at 19, BLE addressed the scope of judicial review in the context of agency non-enforcement action in an individual case. See Crowley, 37 F.3d at 67577 (explaining the basis for distinguishing—for purposes of judicial review—between individual enforce-

same time affording agencies breathing space to adopt enforcement
policies for discretionary reasons,” NAACP, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 234.

25a
ment decisions and implementation of broad enforcement policies). DACA’s rescission involves a broad enforcement policy, not an individual decision. 13
In sum, we hold that Plaintiffs’ claims are reviewable.14
III.
A.
We turn now to the merits and consider first whether
the district court erred in granting summary judgment
to the government on Plaintiffs’ procedural APA claim.
The court determined that DACA’s rescission was akin
to a policy statement and thus was not subject to notice
and comment under the APA. Casa, 284 F. Supp. 3d at
772. We review this determination de novo. Children’s
Hosp. of the King’s Daughters, Inc. v. Azar (“CHKD”),
896 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 2018).

We accept that agency action doesn’t become reviewable simply
because “the agency gives a ‘reviewable’ reason for otherwise unreviewable action.” BLE, 482 U.S. at 283. But, as we’ve explained,
DACA’s rescission is not such an unreviewable decision. See
NAACP, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 231 (“[A]n otherwise reviewable interpretation of a statute does not become presumptively unreviewable
simply because the agency characterizes it as an exercise of enforcement discretion.”).
14
The government has not cross-appealed from the district court’s
additional determination that all Plaintiffs had standing, Casa,
284 F. Supp. 3d at 771, and the parties have not briefed this issue on
appeal. Nonetheless, reviewing this issue de novo, Bostic, 760 F.3d
at 370, we agree with the district court that the individual DACA
recipient Plaintiffs have standing to sue. We consequently need
not consider whether the other Plaintiffs have standing. See id. at
370-71.
13
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The APA generally requires that agencies provide
notice of proposals to create, amend, or repeal a rule 15
and an opportunity for interested persons to comment
on the proposal. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4)-(5), 553(a)-(c).
“Rules issued through the notice-and-comment process
are often referred to as legislative rules because they
have the force and effect of law.” Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “[T]he APA provides[, however,] that,
unless another statute states otherwise, the notice-andcomment requirement ‘does not apply’ to ‘interpretative
rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice.’ ” Id. at 1203-04
(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)).
Plaintiffs argue that DACA’s rescission required notice and comment under the APA because the Rescission
Memo is a legislative rule that mandates how Department officials must act and substantively affects DACA
recipients. The government rejects this premise, countering that the Memo is a general statement of policy.
We agree with the government. 16

The parties don’t dispute that DACA’s rescission qualifies as a
“rule” for APA purposes. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).
16
Accord Regents, 908 F.3d at 512-14 (holding DACA’s rescission
is not a binding rule of substantive law); NAACP, 298 F. Supp. 3d at
237 (“[T]he rescission of DACA was exempt from notice and comment as a general statement of agency policy.”); Batalla Vidal
v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 270-73 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (dismissing
notice-and-comment claims because Rescission Memo is not a legislative rule), appeals docketed, Nos. 18-1521, 18-1525, 18-1986 (2d Cir.
May 21 & July 5, 2018).
15
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The critical question in distinguishing between legislative rules and general statements of policy is whether
the statement “is of present binding effect; if it is, then
the APA calls for notice and comment.” Elec. Privacy
Info. Ctr. v. DHS (“EPIC”), 653 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).
“[S]ubstantive or legislative rule[s], pursuant to properly delegated authority, ha[ve] the force of law, and
create[] new law or impose[] new rights or duties.”
CHKD, 896 F.3d at 620 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Nat’l Latino Media Coal. v. FCC, 816 F.2d 785,
788 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“A valid legislative rule is binding
upon all persons, and on the courts, to the same extent
as a congressional statute.”). “To that end, a rule is
legislative if it supplements a statute, adopts a new position inconsistent with existing regulations, or otherwise effects a substantive change in existing law or policy.” CHKD, 896 F.3d at 620 (internal quotation marks
and alteration omitted).
By contrast, general statements of policy “advise the
public prospectively of the manner in which the agency
proposes to exercise a discretionary power.” Vigil,
508 U.S. at 197 (internal quotation marks omitted). A
directive that doesn’t establish a “binding norm” and
leaves agency officials free to exercise their discretion
qualifies as a general statement of policy. Chen Zhou
Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1341 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing
Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir.
1987), and Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006,
1015 (9th Cir. 1987)).
The Rescission Memo removes a mechanism under
which individuals could receive deferred action but places
“no limitations” on other lawful enforcement prerogatives
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of the Department of Homeland Security. J.A. 384.
As the district court observed, Casa, 284 F. Supp. 3d at
772, the Memo doesn’t curtail the Department’s discretion to make deferred action available on a case-by-case
or ad hoc basis. Nor does the Memo, by its terms, create “right[s] or benefit[s]” enforceable “by any party.”
J.A. 384.
Additionally, although DACA was rescinded based on
the government’s view that the policy was unlawful, the
Rescission Memo doesn’t bind subsequent Secretaries
who might disagree with this reasoning or bar the Department from implementing other deferred action policies in the future. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ arguments,
the Memo doesn’t “replace[] agency discretion with a new
binding rule of substantive law,” Mada-Luna, 813 F.2d
at 1014 (internal quotation marks omitted), affecting the
rights of people regulated by the Department, see EPIC,
653 F.3d at 7 (agency’s statement “cast in mandatory
language so the affected private parties are reasonably
led to believe that failure to conform will bring adverse
consequences” qualifies as binding on those subject to it
(internal quotation marks omitted)). It therefore falls
on the policy “end of the spectrum,” CHKD, 896 F.3d at
620-21 (internal quotation marks omitted), and thus was
exempt from notice and comment under the APA.
B.
We consider next whether the district court erred in
granting summary judgment to the government on
Plaintiffs’ claim that DACA’s rescission is substantively
invalid under the APA.
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1.
The APA requires a reviewing court to “hold unlawful
and set aside agency action . . . found to be . . .
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
These “criteria render our oversight highly deferential,
with a presumption in favor of finding the agency action
valid.” Friends of Back Bay v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 681 F.3d 581, 587 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard, however, “does not
reduce judicial review to a rubber stamp of agency action.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, “we must engage in a searching and careful inquiry
of the [administrative] record, so that we may consider
whether the agency considered the relevant factors and
whether a clear error of judgment was made.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Where agency action
qualifies as “unreasonable as a matter of law, it is likely
to have been arbitrary and capricious.” Id. (citing
Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 n.23
(1989)). “We evaluate [this issue] de novo[.]” Id.
To comply with § 706(2)(A), an agency “must examine
the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). The giving of “adequate reasons” for an agency’s decision is “[o]ne of the
basic procedural requirements of administrative rulemaking.” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct.
2117, 2125 (2016). In a challenge under § 706(2)(A), “an
agency’s action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself.” State Farm, 463 U.S.
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at 50; see Jimenez-Cedillo v. Sessions, 885 F.3d 292, 299
(4th Cir. 2018) (“[A] reviewing court may not speculate
on reasons that might have supported a change in
agency position []or supply a reasoned basis for the
agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
An agency satisfactorily explains a decision when it
provides “enough clarity that its ‘path may reasonably
be discerned.’ ” Jimenez-Cedillo, 885 F.3d at 297 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)). If the agency provides such an explanation, “we will uphold its decision.”
Id. at 297-98. “But where the agency has failed to provide even that minimal level of analysis, its action is arbitrary and capricious and so cannot carry the force of
law.” Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2125.
These principles apply with equal force to a change
in agency position. Jimenez-Cedillo, 885 F.3d at 298.
Thus, in changing policies, agencies “must ‘provide a reasoned explanation for the change.’ ” Id. (quoting Encino
Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2125). “At a minimum, an
agency must ‘display awareness that it is changing position and show that there are good reasons for the new
policy.’ ” Id. (quoting Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at
2126). The agency’s explanation must address the “facts
and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by
the prior policy,” including any “serious reliance interests.” Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2126 (quoting
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 51516 (2009)). “An ‘unexplained inconsistency’ in agency
policy indicates that the agency’s action is arbitrary and
capricious, and therefore unlawful.” Jimenez-Cedillo,
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885 F.3d at 298 (quoting Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct.
at 2125).
2.
Plaintiffs argue that DACA’s rescission was arbitrary and capricious because the Department of Homeland Security failed to give a reasoned explanation for
the change in policy, particularly given the significant
reliance interests involved. We agree.17
As we have explained, DACA was rescinded based on
the Department’s view that the policy was unlawful.
But neither the Attorney General’s September 4 letter
nor the Department’s Rescission Memo identify any
statutory provision with which the DACA policy conflicts. Cf. Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2127 (rejecting as insufficient agency statement regarding statutory
exemption proffered in support of policy change where
agency did not “analyze or explain” why statute should
be interpreted as agency suggested).
The Attorney General’s letter does mention that the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the injunction against the DAPA
policy on “multiple legal grounds” in the Texas litigation, J.A. 379, and the Rescission Memo cites to this ruling. The Fifth Circuit’s ruling was based in part on its
determination that the DAPA policy likely ran counter
to the INA’s “intricate process for illegal aliens to derive
a lawful immigration classification from their children’s
immigration status.” Texas, 809 F.3d at 179. There
Plaintiffs also assert that (1) the district court failed to consider
evidence of “bad faith” and “animus” underlying the decision to rescind DACA presented in their complaint and (2) the Department’s
conclusions about DACA’s legality are substantively incorrect.
Given our disposition, we decline to address these arguments.
17
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is no dispute here, however, that “DACA has no analogue in the INA.” NAACP, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 239 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, as the Fifth
Circuit explained in reaching its conclusion, “DACA and
DAPA are not identical.” Texas, 809 F.3d at 174.
The Attorney General’s letter also asserts that DACA
suffered from the same “constitutional defects that the
courts recognized as to DAPA.” J.A. 379. The courts in
the Texas litigation, however, did not address constitutional claims. And while the Attorney General urged
in his letter that his office had a duty to “defend the Constitution” and “faithfully execute the laws passed by Congress,” J.A. 379, he does not explain how allowing the
DACA policy to remain in effect would violate that duty.
The Attorney General’s letter and the Rescission
Memo also proffer the concern—based on the Attorney
General’s determination that the DAPA and DACA policies share the same legal defects—that “potentially imminent” litigation would result in a ruling in the Texas
litigation enjoining DACA. Entirely absent, however,
is an explanation why it was likely that the district court
in the Texas litigation would have enjoined DACA.
Further, the 2014 OLC Opinion outlining the Department’s authority to implement the DAPA policy identified “from the nature of the Take Care duty” at least
“four general . . . principles governing the permissible scope of enforcement discretion,” J.A. 137-38;
2014 WL 10788677, at *5-6, and noted that concerns “animating DACA were . . . consistent with the types
of concerns that have customarily guided the exercise of
immigration enforcement discretion,” J.A. 149 n.8; 2014
WL 10788677, at *13 n.8.
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The point is that the Department had before it at the
time it rescinded DACA a reasoned analysis from the
office tasked with providing legal advice to all executive
branch agencies that supported the policy’s legality.
Yet the Department changed course without any explanation for why that analysis was faulty. Cf. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 516 (“[A] reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances
that underlay . . . the prior policy.”).
Nor did the Department adequately account for the
reliance interests that would be affected by its decision.
Hundreds of thousands of people had structured their
lives on the availability of deferred action during the
over five years between the implementation of DACA
and the decision to rescind. Although the government
insists that Acting Secretary Duke 18 considered these
interests in connection with her decision to rescind
DACA, her Memo makes no mention of them.
Accordingly, we hold that the Department’s decision
to rescind DACA was arbitrary and capricious and must
be set aside.
IV.
We turn next to the district court’s rulings (1) granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs on the portion of
their estoppel claim pertaining to sharing of DACA applicant information, and (2) ordering the government to
The government urges us to consider the June 2018 memorandum from former Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen
belatedly proffered by the government as a basis for upholding
DACA’s rescission. We decline to do so because the memorandum
was not part of the administrative record in this appeal. Fla. Power
& Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743 (1985).
18
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comply with the information-sharing policies promulgated in 2012 and enjoining it from altering those policies.
“Equitable estoppel is a well-established concept invoked by courts to aid a party who, in good faith, has
relied, to his detriment, upon the representations of another.” United States ex rel. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v.
Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 402 F.2d 893, 897 (4th Cir. 1968)
(internal footnote omitted). To establish equitable estoppel, “[i]t is only necessary to show that the person
[sought to be] estopped, by . . . statements or conduct, misled another to his prejudice.” Id. at 898 (quoting United States ex rel. Noland Co. v. Wood, 99 F.2d
80, 82 (4th Cir. 1938)). As against the government, “estoppel may only be justified, if ever, in the presence of
affirmative misconduct by government agents.” Dawkins v. Witt, 318 F.3d 606, 611 (4th Cir. 2003).
In enjoining the government, the district court determined that estoppel “potentially would apply to any use
for immigration enforcement of the information collected
. . . during DACA registrations” because “the Government promised not to transfer or use the information gathered from [DACA applicants] for immigration enforcement.” Casa, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 778.
We disagree with the district court. The government
did not make such a promise or suggest in any other way
that its policies governing the sharing of information provided by DACA applicants would never change. Rather,
the government warned DACA applicants that information they provided could be used for immigration enforcement where criteria for commencement of removal proceedings or referral to law enforcement for a determination whether to commence such proceedings were met.
It also warned that its policies governing the sharing of
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applicant information could be “modified, superseded, or
rescinded at any time without notice” and created no
“right or benefit.” J.A. 1004. In view of these clear and
unequivocal warnings, Plaintiffs could not reasonably believe that the information they provided as part of their
DACA application would never be used for immigration
enforcement purposes. Cf. Volvo Trucks of N. Am., Inc.
v. United States, 367 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Equitable estoppel requires reasonable reliance.”). Plaintiffs’
equitable estoppel claim thus necessarily fails.
V.
We turn finally to Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims,
which were dismissed by the district court. We decline
to decide whether DACA’s rescission violates the Fifth
Amendment’s due process and equal protection guarantees under the “well established principle governing the
prudent exercise of this [c]ourt’s jurisdiction that normally
the [c]ourt will not decide a constitutional question if there
is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case.”
Escambia Cty. v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per
curiam). Because we have determined that DACA’s rescission violates the APA, we need go no further. See,
e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 265 (5th Cir. 2016).
We also decline to decide whether Plaintiffs’ Fifth
Amendment rights were violated by the policies announced on September 5, 2017, regarding the sharing of personal information from DACA applicants. 19
McMillan, 466 U.S. at 51. Our decision today restores
DACA to its pre-September 5, 2017, status, rendering a
Although the district court found Plaintiffs’ due process
claims lacked merit, its analysis addressed DACA’s rescission, not
information-sharing. Casa, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 775-77.
19
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nullity the information-sharing policies announced on
September 5. It therefore is unnecessary to address
Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to these policies. See
Veasey, 830 F.3d at 265. 20
VI.
To sum up: We affirm the district court’s rulings
that Plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable and that DACA’s
rescission did not require notice and comment under the
APA. We reverse the district court’s ruling sustaining
the rescission of the policy as valid under 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A). DACA’s rescission is vacated as arbitrary
and capricious, and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We reverse
the district court’s ruling finding Plaintiffs entitled to
injunctive relief on equitable estoppel grounds, reverse
the grant of summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor, and
vacate the injunction. Because we find it unnecessary to
decide Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to DACA’s
rescission and the related changes to the Department’s

Plaintiffs also contend that the district court misapplied Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56 by failing to (1) afford them a reasonable opportunity for
discovery on their claims, (2) consider or address their statement of
material facts in dispute, and (3) view the facts in the light most favorable to them. They allege further that the district court misapplied the APA by granting summary judgment to the government
without addressing their contention that the administrative record
was incomplete and by failing to consider evidence of “bad faith and
improper behavior” by government officials. Given our disposition,
we find it unnecessary to address these issues.
20
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policies governing use of information provided by DACA
applicants, we vacate the district court’s judgment on
these issues and dismiss those claims.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
DISMISSED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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RICHARDSON , Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The plaintiffs ask this Court to invalidate the rescission of DACA, a seven-year-old program explained at its
inception as an act of prosecutorial discretion. The Majority’s opinion grants this request, reasoning that the
Department of Homeland Security behaved in an arbitrary and capricious manner by giving what my good
colleagues decide are faulty legal reasons for rescinding
the discretionary policy.
I disagree with the premise that the Administrative
Procedure Act permits this review of the Executive
Branch’s rescission of DACA. Enforcement discretion
lies at the heart of executive power. The Executive
may decide to prosecute, or not prosecute, an individual
or a group so long as the reasons for that decision are
constitutionally sound and the decision does not violate
or abdicate the Executive’s statutory duties. Here, the
Executive’s proper exercise of that discretion to rescind
DACA is judicially unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, regardless of one’s view of the policy
questions underlying DACA. To hold otherwise permits the Judicial Branch to invade the province of the
Executive and impair the carefully constructed separation of powers laid out in our Constitution.
I. Background

The Secretary of Homeland Security is charged by
statute with enforcing the nation’s immigration laws.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a); 6 U.S.C. § 202(5). Among those
responsibilities is removing individuals subject to removal under federal law. See Arizona v. United States,
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567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012). “A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.” Id. At each stage of the process—
from investigation to execution of a removal order—the
Secretary has the discretion to pursue removal or forbear doing so. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999).
The Secretary has used this discretion to prioritize
the removal of certain categories of aliens and deprioritize others. See, e.g., Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Commissioner, Dep’t of Justice, Immigration &
Naturalization Service, “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion” 7-9 (Nov. 17, 2000) (deprioritizing the removal
of aliens who, for instance, resided in the United States
for a long time, had little to no criminal history, and had
greater ties to the United States than another country);
Memorandum from John Morton, Director, Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
“Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with
the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the
Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal
of Aliens” 2 (June 17, 2011) (deprioritizing the removal
of veterans, minors, elderly individuals, pregnant women,
and various other groups). On top of these general, department-wide enforcement policies, individual agents
have been empowered to exercise enforcement discretion based on specific circumstances. See, e.g., Meissner Memorandum at 1-2. Just as a highway patrolman
has discretion whether to pull over a given driver (and
even after pulling someone over, whether to give that
person a ticket), immigration agents can weigh individual and country-specific humanitarian circumstances
when deciding whether to exercise their prosecutorial
discretion. See Morton Memorandum at 4.
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Relying on this broad enforcement discretion to set
enforcement priorities and to guide agents in rendering
their individualized enforcement decisions, the Secretary of Homeland Security established the DACA program. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secretary,
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the
United States as Children” (June 15, 2012). DACA authorized agents to grant deferred action 1 to certain people brought illegally to the United States as children.
Under DACA, aliens who applied and satisfied certain
gateway criteria were “granted” or “denied” deferred
action, ostensibly on an individualized, case-by-case basis. Id. Even when granted, deferred action could be
revoked unilaterally by the Department. See AAADC,
525 U.S. at 484-85. The DACA memorandum stated
expressly that it conferred upon recipients of deferred
action “no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship.” Napolitano Memorandum at 3.
Two years later, the Secretary expanded DACA by
loosening some restrictions and extending the period of
deferred action from two years to three. Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., “Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants” (Nov. 20, 2014).
In the same action, the Secretary also created a new enforcement policy, known as “DAPA,” extending “deferred
action, on a case-by-case basis,” to parents of American
citizens and lawful permanent residents. Id. at 4.

“Deferred action” means “an act of administrative convenience
to the government which gives some cases lower priority.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 274a.12(c)(14).
1

41a
Led by Texas, a coalition of states challenged this
new policy in federal court, arguing that DAPA (and the
DACA expansion) violated the Administrative Procedure Act as well as the President’s Article II duty to
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3. The district court preliminarily enjoined DAPA, holding that the Department had “legislated a substantive rule without complying with the procedural requirements under the” APA. Texas v. United
States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015). The
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that the
Department had promulgated DAPA in violation of the
APA and that it was “manifestly contrary” to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Texas v. United
States, 809 F.3d 134, 182 (5th Cir. 2015). 2
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and directed
the parties to brief not only the issues decided by the
Fifth Circuit, but also whether “the Guidance violates
the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, § 3.”
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016). But after
oral argument, the Fifth Circuit decision was summarily
affirmed by an equally divided Court. United States v.
Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016).
In response, the Secretary rescinded the enjoined
DAPA program and DACA expansion. Memorandum
from John Kelly, Secretary, Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
“Rescission of November 20, 2014 Memorandum” (June
In finding DAPA subject to review under the APA, the Fifth Circuit held that deferred action “is much more than nonenforcement.”
Texas, 809 F.3d at 166. The court reasoned that since recipients are
conferred “lawful presence” and may receive associated benefits such
as driver’s licenses and unemployment insurance, deferred action was
not an exercise of enforcement discretion. Id. at 168, 168 n.108.
2
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15, 2017). And several months later, after Texas threatened to challenge the original DACA policy, the Acting
Secretary similarly rescinded DACA. Memorandum
from Elaine Duke, Acting Secretary, Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., “Rescission of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum”
(Sept. 5, 2017).
In justifying her decision to rescind DACA, the Acting Secretary referred to the Supreme Court and Fifth
Circuit decisions in the DAPA litigation. She also relied on a letter from the Attorney General that asserted
that because DACA “has the same legal and constitutional defects that the courts recognized as to DAPA, it
is likely that potentially imminent litigation would yield
similar results with respect to DACA.” Id. at 3-4. The
Acting Secretary nonetheless ordered that DACA be
wound down in stages over a six-month period. Id.
II.

Administrative Procedure Act Review

The plaintiffs primarily contend that the rescission of
DACA violates the APA. Because I find that immigration enforcement decisions are committed to the discretion of the Department, I part with my colleagues and
conclude that the rescission of DACA is judicially unreviewable under the APA. 3
A.

Discretionary enforcement decisions are presumptively
unreviewable.

The APA regulates the decisionmaking process of
federal agencies. As such, the statute provides for the
judicial review of a “final agency action for which there
is no other adequate remedy in court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704.
The plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are, of course, reviewable,
and I address them separately below.
3
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Even so, the statute does not permit review of agency
action that “is committed to agency discretion by law.”
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). This provision applies to a variety
of agency decisions that are unsuitable for judicial review. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993);
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 410 (1971). One essential category of decisions “generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion” consists of enforcement decisions, both in the civil and criminal arenas. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
Discretion in prosecutorial enforcement is deeply
rooted in the Constitution’s separation of powers. See,
e.g., In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 264 (D.C. Cir.
2013); Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor,
73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 537-63 (2005). Indeed, the
division of labor with respect to enforcement is among
the most critical protections the Constitution affords:
The Executive Branch decides whether and when to
begin enforcement actions while the Judicial Branch adjudicates the government’s claims. This division reflects the Framers’ recognition that, “in the long term,
structural protections against abuse of power were critical to preserving liberty.” Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 730 (1986).
Encroachment by the judiciary into enforcement decisions upsets this constitutional balance. If judges
could decide which cases to prosecute, that would combine the role of prosecutor and judge in one branch of
government, seriously risking individual liberty. See
In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2003);
see also 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF
LAWS 154 (Thomas Nugent trans., 6th ed. 1792) (“[T]here
is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated
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from the legislative and executive.”). And if the judiciary could decide which meritorious cases not to prosecute, that would improperly divest the President, who
unlike judges is elected by the people, of the executive
authority that the Constitution affords to protect public
safety and enhance public welfare. Thus, in “the ordinary case, ‘so long as the prosecutor has probable cause
to believe that the accused committed an offense defined
by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and
what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.’ ” United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)); see also
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“[T]he
Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute
discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.”).
The judiciary’s role is to protect individuals by properly
adjudicating the charges against them—for example, by
dismissing meritless enforcement actions after they are
filed. It is normally neither appropriate nor necessary
for judges to involve themselves in the decision to bring,
or not to bring, enforcement actions.
Though perhaps more often discussed in the criminal
context, this broad enforcement discretion also encompasses civil enforcement decisions. See Speed Mining,
Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety, 528 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir.
2008); see also Southern Ry. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 448 (1979). Indeed, the Supreme
Court has recognized that the concerns that counsel
against reviewing criminal enforcement decisions are
even stronger in the context of immigration removal decisions. AAADC, 525 U.S. at 490 (noting that the “sys-
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temic costs” of judicial supervision of enforcement decisions are “greatly magnified in the deportation context”);
see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976).
The nature of civil enforcement discretion led the Supreme Court in Heckler v. Chaney to hold that an agency’s
nonenforcement decision was presumptively unreviewable under the APA. In that case, the Food and Drug
Administration refused to take civil enforcement action
against a class of drug manufacturers and others who
produced and distributed drugs used by states to perform executions. The FDA explained its decision not
to institute any enforcement action as a product of concerns that it lacked jurisdiction to address the use of
drugs in such a way. Yet even if it could, the FDA
noted that it would decline to exercise jurisdiction over
those manufacturers under its inherent enforcement
discretion. The Court found the decision to be presumptively unreviewable under the APA because agency
enforcement decisions “involve[] a complicated balancing of a number of factors,” like allocating resources and
prioritizing policies, that “are peculiarly within [the
FDA’s] expertise” and are thus generally unsuitable for
judicial review. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831; cf. Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (noting that the
factors that underlie prosecution decisions are of the
type that courts are not competent to evaluate).
While civil enforcement decisions are presumptively
unreviewable, Congress can overcome that presumption
by “circumscrib[ing] agency enforcement discretion”
through a substantive statute. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 834;
see also id. at 830 (noting that judicial review is unavailable under the APA if the statute provides “no judicially
manageable standards . . . for judging how and
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when an agency should exercise its discretion”). In
this way, Congress retains the ability to restrict the Executive’s enforcement discretion. In Chaney, to decide
whether the FDA was so restricted, the Court examined
the relevant statutory provisions and determined that
the statutes provided no dictate about when enforcement discretion must be exercised. Since the FDA’s
enforcement discretion was both statutorily authorized
and unconstrained, the Court held that the enforcement
decision was not subject to APA review.
Chaney also noted, without deciding, two other possible bases for judicial review of civil nonenforcement
decisions: if (1) the decision was based “solely on belief
that [the agency] lacked jurisdiction”; or (2) an agency
expressly adopted a “general policy that is so extreme
as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.” 470 U.S. at 833 n.4. The Supreme Court
later rejected the first possibility in I.C.C. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, finding that an agency’s
reliance on a “reviewable reason” for an otherwise unreviewable discretionary decision did not transform the
decision into one subject to APA review. 482 U.S. 270,
283 (1987). The second, which might be thought related to the Take Care Clause, U.S. CONST. art II, § 3,
remains a narrow exception theoretically permitting judicial review of agency enforcement decisions in some
rare cases.
B.

The rescission of DACA is not reviewable.

The decision to rescind DACA is precisely the sort of
enforcement decision that is “traditionally . . . ‘committed to agency discretion’ ” and not reviewable by the
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courts. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832. None of the recognized exceptions to that limitation apply, and so the rescission of DACA is not reviewable under the APA.
The Supreme Court has recognized that a “principal
feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.” Arizona v. United
States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012). Indeed, executive decisions about immigration enforcement are even further
beyond the capacity of judicial review than criminal enforcement decisions, which are otherwise thought to
represent the peak of executive discretion. AAADC,
525 U.S. at 489-90.
As a result, with or without DACA, government
agents have discretion to grant deferred action in individual cases. Id. at 483-84, 484 n.8. At least by its
own terms, DACA did not eliminate the individualized
discretion over enforcement decisions: it created procedural and substantive scaffolding to guide that discretion. See Napolitano Memorandum at 2. Rescinding
DACA took away the scaffolding but left the underlying
core—individualized discretion—untouched. Thus, insofar as DACA is merely a programmatic enforcement
decision, so is its rescission, and both are unreviewable.
The best argument in favor of reviewability is that
DACA itself was something other than an enforcement
decision. Once granted, deferred action makes recipients eligible for benefits such as the ability to work legally in the country. These are subsidiary or collateral
benefits that arise from other legal provisions not challenged here. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (“ ‘[U]nauthorized alien’ means . . . that the alien is not at that
time . . . authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by the Attorney General.”); see also 8 C.F.R.
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§ 274a.12(c)(14). Yet the Fifth Circuit found DAPA reviewable because it “would affirmatively confer ‘lawful
presence’ and associated benefits.” Texas, 809 F.3d at
166. Moreover, some have argued that DACA only
masquerades as a program involving individualized discretion and in fact amounts to an entitlement of benefits
for the class of aliens who meet the program’s threshold
criteria. Again, the Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion about DAPA. See id. at 171-76.
But neither side presses such an argument in this
case, and for good reason. The government does not
because it claims DACA’s rescission is unreviewable.
Nor do the plaintiffs, because if they did, their case
would be much harder on the merits. DACA relied on
identified individualized enforcement as a necessary
predicate for the program’s existence. See The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize
Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the
United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op.
O.L.C. ____, 2014 WL 10788677, at *13 n.8 (Nov. 19,
2014). If that predicate was false, then DACA was almost surely procedurally and substantively invalid.
And that would mean one of the Department’s proffered
explanations for rescinding DACA—that it was likely
unlawful—was valid. Unsurprisingly then, the plaintiffs do not rely on this point, giving us no occasion to
consider whether DACA might be anything other than
what it claimed to be: a program for a specific exercise
of prosecutorial discretion.
No other exception makes the plaintiffs’ APA claims
reviewable. In particular, nothing in the INA overcomes Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability. That
presumption “may be rebutted where the substantive
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statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow
in exercising its enforcement powers.” Chaney, 470 U.S.
at 832-33; see also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988)
(“§ 701(a)(2) requires careful examination of the statute
on which the claim of agency illegality is based[.]”).
Nothing in the INA cabins the government’s broad immigration enforcement discretion. To the contrary, the
INA expansively vests the Secretary of Homeland Security with authority for “establishing national immigration
enforcement policies and priorities.” 6 U.S.C. § 202(5);
see also 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). Our nation’s immigration laws do not limit the Secretary’s authority to enforce those laws by removing illegal aliens. As a result,
the INA does not overcome the presumptive unreviewability of the DACA rescission.
C.

The generalized nature of DACA does not render its
rescission reviewable .

The Majority adopts a new exception, contending
that general enforcement policies, unlike individual enforcement decisions, are reviewable. While this exception has some support in out-of-circuit precedent, I
would reject it.
This exception is grounded in dictum from Chaney,
which left open the possibility of review when an agency
adopts a “general policy that is so extreme as to amount
to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.”
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (emphasis added). That is,
a general policy that licensed illegal conduct across the
board or that categorically excluded a class of individuals from complying with the law might well be reviewable. But nobody here is arguing that the rescission of
DACA should be so characterized. Nor could they. A
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return to the pre-DACA regime would increase the Department’s enforcement of the immigration laws, not
abandon it.
A few cases from the D.C. Circuit seem to stretch
Chaney’s dictum to encompass any “general enforcement policy,” as opposed to a “single-shot nonenforcement
decision.” E.g., OSG Bulk Ships, Inc. v. United States,
132 F.3d 808, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 676 (D.C. Cir.
1994)). The facts of these cases suggest this principle
may be narrower than it appears at first blush. For example, in some cases, the agency’s policy was promulgated as a binding regulation after notice-and-comment
rulemaking, which would of course be much more amenable to judicial review than a program like DACA, announced by an informal memorandum. See National
Wildlife Federation v. EPA, 980 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir.
1992). It also appears that these cases did not involve
programs that, like DACA, were expressly predicated
on the agency’s exercise of individualized discretion.
To the extent that the D.C. Circuit has embraced the
broad principle that any “general enforcement policy”
is judicially reviewable, that principle simply cannot be
reconciled with Chaney. There, the Supreme Court
held unreviewable the FDA’s categorical decision not to
take enforcement action against a class of actors (drug
manufacturers, prison administrators, and others in the
drug distribution chain). 470 U.S. at 824-25, 837-38.
The fact that the decision was made by the FDA Commissioner made no difference. See id. at 824. The
D.C. Circuit’s decisions in this area do not even attempt
to explain how this sweeping principle can be reconciled
with the facts of Chaney. See, e.g., Crowley, 37 F.3d at
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675-77. Indeed, they often have no reasoning, simply
reciting language (often dicta) from earlier circuit cases.
Such a broad exception for “generalized enforcement
policies” would also unduly trammel the Executive
Branch in carrying out its duties. The head of an
agency has every right to exercise enforcement discretion. Standardizing (i.e., generalizing) how agents use
their prosecutorial discretion does not alter its character. Whether the Secretary exercises her discretion
over an individual case or provides guidance for how discretion should be applied in a class of cases, the decision
is unreviewable as one “committed to agency discretion
by law.” Under the plaintiffs’ view, a line agent’s decision not to remove a cancer-stricken alien would be unreviewable, but a front-office policy directing line agents
to consider whether an alien is terminally ill would be
reviewable. That distinction is untenable. See Perales v. Casillas, 903 F.2d 1043, 1048 (5th Cir. 1990)
(holding that § 701(a)(2) precluded review of a categorical refusal by a district office to grant work authorization and pre-hearing voluntary departure to a certain
class of eligible aliens over a three-year period).
As anyone who has exercised enforcement discretion
knows, supervisory control over that discretion is necessary to avoid arbitrariness and ensure consistency.
Supervision through generalized guidance that directs
the exercise of enforcement discretion cannot transform
the enforcement directive into a reviewable action. To
find that discretionary enforcement decisions are unreviewable only when inferior officers exercise single-shot
enforcement decisions also brushes aside the separation
of powers that the Constitution lays out. The President is empowered by Article II to “take Care that the
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Laws be faithfully executed,” and thus may hire officers
to assist in these duties. But the constitutional responsibility remains firmly at the President’s feet, and therefore, the President remains responsible for his subordinates’ exercise of executive power. Free Enter. Fund
v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484
(2010) (“The President cannot ‘take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee the faithfulness of the officers who execute them.”). 4
DACA—at least on its face—was just such an unreviewable exercise of supervisory enforcement discretion. It was issued by the Secretary and instructed her
subordinates when and how to exercise their discretion,
emphasizing that “requests for relief pursuant to this
memorandum are to be decided on a case by case basis.”
The supervisory use of prosecutorial discretion is not a novel
phenomenon. See, e.g., Treasury Department Circular to the Supervisors of the Revenue (Sept. 30, 1791), in 9 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 248-49 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965) (advising Treasury officials that “a great relaxation appears unavoidable” in enforcing provisions for seizing spirits without required certificates); Ruth
Wedgewood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins,
100 YALE L.J. 229, 278, 339-53 (1990) (describing President Adams’s
decision to direct the federal prosecutor to enter a nolle prosequi for
an allegedly mutinous sailor and describing then-Representative
John Marshall’s floor speech defending the Executive’s prosecutorial discretion, see 10 ANNALS OF CONG., 6th Cong. 1st Sess. 614-17
(Mar. 7, 1800)); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS, THE JEFFERSONIANS: 1801-1829, at 5-6 (2001) (noting President Jefferson’s “decision to pardon two individuals who had been
convicted under the Sedition Act and to quash the pending prosecution of a third”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Duane
(May 23, 1801), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 54, 55
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897) (explaining that whenever President
Jefferson should be met with a prosecution under the Sedition law
he would treat it as a nullity and order a nolle prosequi).
4
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Napolitano Memorandum at 2. Such general decisions
on enforcement policy, no less than the individual decisions that flow from them, cannot be reviewed by the
courts without intruding on the prerogatives of the Executive Branch. And that is necessarily true of DACA’s
rescission, which merely removed one avenue for exercising individualized discretion. As a result, the rescission is an even less viable candidate for judicial review
than is the promulgation of DACA.
D.

The Acting Secretary’s use of legal reasoning in
rescinding DACA does not render her decision
reviewable.

The plaintiffs also argue that the Acting Secretary’s
use of legal reasoning in deciding to rescind DACA
makes the decision subject to judicial review. In their
view, courts can evaluate legal determinations.
This argument is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has matter-of-factly explained that there is no “principle that if the agency gives
a reviewable reason for otherwise unreviewable action,
the action becomes reviewable.” BLE, 482 U.S. at 283
(internal quotation marks omitted). Enforcement decisions are often intertwined with legal reasoning, most obviously “the prosecutor’s belief (sometimes publicly
stated) that the law will not sustain a conviction.” Id.
The Court found it “entirely clear” that this “reviewable”
proposition cannot render the prosecutor’s “refusal to
prosecute” subject to judicial review. Id.
Efforts to distinguish BLE factually cannot avoid its
holding. In BLE, an agency had refused to reconsider
a prior decision on the ground of material error. The
Court found that such denials of reconsideration have
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“traditionally been ‘committed to agency discretion by
law.’ ” Id. at 282 (quoting Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832).
As here, the plaintiffs argued that the particular decision before the Court should be reviewable anyway, because the agency had based its refusal on a reviewable
issue of law. The Court disagreed and held, as noted,
that an unreviewable decision does not become reviewable by virtue of the reasons provided. Id. at 280-81.
That holding is plainly not limited to cases involving requests for reconsideration. After BLE, the scope of
permissible judicial review must be determined by the
type of agency action at issue and not the agency’s reasons for acting.
Just as in BLE, there is a nonsensical implication in
the plaintiffs’ position: that the Executive’s discretion
is more constrained when it gives a “reviewable” reason
for its actions than when it gives no reason at all. If the
Acting Secretary was wrong about the likely illegality
of DACA,5 then this might mean that she had provided
no lawful reason for the rescission. But in the context

Evaluating the actual legality of DACA requires considering
whether and how a court may adjudicate an alleged violation of the
Take Care Clause. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes,
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838). But it also requires addressing
the distinct question of whether and how one presidential administration may determine that a previous administration’s policy was
inconsistent with the constitutional obligation to take care that the
nation’s immigration laws be faithfully executed. Cf. Letter from
President George Washington to Sec’y Alexander Hamilton, U.S.
Dep’t of the Treasury (Sept. 7, 1792) in 32 WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 144 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) (writing in 1792
about enforcing unpopular tax laws, President Washington explained that it was his “duty to see the Laws executed: to permit
them to be trampled upon with impunity would be repugnant to it”).
5
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of the Executive’s enforcement discretion, this is perfectly appropriate. The Executive need not explain why
it makes particular enforcement and non-enforcement
decisions. The Judicial Branch cannot bootstrap review of decisions committed to the discretion of the
other branches simply because the reasons provided are
of a type that judges consider themselves competent to
evaluate.
In any event, the Acting Secretary’s rescission memorandum was not a mere statement on the legality of
DACA. Instead, the memorandum considered various
court rulings as well as the Attorney General’s letter before concluding that the “DACA program should be terminated.” Duke Memorandum at 4 (emphasis added).
She did not say that DACA must be terminated or that she
lacked the legal authority to enforce DACA or a DACAlike program. And in declaring the rescission of DACA
after a six-month wind-down period, the Acting Secretary
invoked her statutory authority to “establish[] national immigration policies and priorities.” Id. The Acting Secretary’s legal analysis was only one aspect of her reasoning for rescinding DACA, and, of course, a prosecutor may
consider beliefs about the law when setting enforcement
policy, see BLE, 482 U.S. at 283.
For these reasons, I conclude that the plaintiffs’ APA
claims are not reviewable and would dismiss them.
III.

Constitutional Claims

Because they rule for the plaintiffs under the APA,
my colleagues in the Majority decline to address the
plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. But because I find the
plaintiffs’ APA claims to be unreviewable, I must briefly
address their claims that the rescission of DACA also
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violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantees of Due Process and Equal Protection. 6 I have little trouble concluding that it did not.
A.

Due Process

The plaintiffs’ due process claim fails to articulate a
constitutionally protected life, liberty, or property interest impacted by the rescission of DACA. And without
a protected interest, there can be no unconstitutional
deprivation.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4. A plaintiff raising a due
process claim must thus begin by identifying a relevant
liberty or property interest. Wooten v. Clifton Forge
Sch. Bd., 655 F.2d 552, 554 (4th Cir. 1981). While a government benefit may create such an interest, “a person
clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire
for [the benefit]. . . . He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Bd. of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
While the plaintiffs argue that DACA created such a
claim of entitlement, it did not. On its face, DACA explicitly conferred no protected property or liberty interest, making deferred action putatively available on a discretionary case-by-case basis for two-year periods that
could be terminated at any time at the Secretary’s discretion. See Napolitano Memorandum at 2-3; AAADC,

Of course, courts may review the exercise of enforcement discretion for compliance with the Constitution. See Armstrong, 517 U.S.
at 464.
6
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525 U.S. at 484-85. The memorandum itself acknowledged that such rights could be conferred only by “Congress, acting through its legislative authority.” Id. at
3; see also Smith v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 425, 429 (4th Cir.
2002) (noting that for a statute to create a liberty or
property interest, “it must confer more than a mere expectation (even one supported by consistent government practice) of a benefit”). Having failed to show a
protected interest, the plaintiffs’ due process claim fails.
The plaintiffs may have serious concerns about our
nation’s immigration laws and the Department’s policy
of enforcing those laws. But an understandable policy
concern is not a legally cognizable right. The rescission of DACA simply does not generate a due process
claim.
B.

Equal Protection

The plaintiffs also argue that the rescission of DACA
violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection by targeting a class of aliens for removal based
on their race and national origin. See Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). They have failed to plausibly
allege such a claim.
As both parties acknowledge, DACA is an enforcement policy, and so the plaintiffs’ challenge to its rescission is necessarily a selective-prosecution claim. 7 In an
The plaintiffs assert that they are not claiming selective prosecution “but instead that the Government violated the Equal Protection Clause by rescinding the DACA program in order to target a
class defined by race and national origin.” Appellants’ Response
Brief at 30. This attempted rewording makes no difference. The
rescission of DACA reset the agency’s enforcement policies to no
longer channel the exercise of enforcement discretion in a certain
7
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ordinary selective-prosecution case, the plaintiffs would
have to show that the government’s conduct “had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.
598, 608 (1985); see also Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (noting that “the decision whether to prosecute may not be
based on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification’ ”) (emphasis added)
(quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)). There
is also a “presumption that a prosecutor has acted lawfully,” which can be displaced only by “clear evidence.”
AAADC, 525 U.S. at 489. But the plaintiffs’ burden is
even higher in this case, because the rescission of DACA
only applies to aliens who are in this country illegally.
Such an alien “has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation,” with a possible exception for “rare” cases of particularly “outrageous” discrimination. Id. at 488, 491.
Here, both DACA and its rescission are, on their face,
neutral policies. Logically, the presumption of lawfulness that applies in individual selective-prosecution cases
is at least as strong when applied to neutral policies
promulgated by senior Executive Branch officials. And
the plaintiffs must allege facts that, if true, plausibly
suggest that this presumption can be overcome and replaced with an inference of outrageous discrimination.
The plaintiffs have alleged two sets of facts to support their claim of discrimination. First, they argue

way. As the plaintiffs cannot dispute that the government has the
statutory authority to enforce the immigration laws against them,
any equal protection claim in this context must necessarily be a
selective-prosecution claim.
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that since 93% of DACA recipients are Latino, the program’s rescission had a disparate impact. A selectiveprosecution claim normally requires differential treatment of “similarly situated individuals of a different
race.” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465. Yet who is “similarly situated” to DACA recipients except other DACA
recipients? Setting aside the closely related and nowrescinded DAPA program, DACA stands alone as a
unique exercise of Executive authority. While there
are other deferred action programs (many of which are
statutory), none resembles DACA. And the Department
rescinded DACA for all recipients, not just for those of
a particular ethnicity or nationality.
Second, the plaintiffs rely on presidential campaign
tweets, which they claim show invidious animus. But
the plaintiffs must create a plausible inference that the
same animus allegedly underlying these statements also
motivated the Attorney General and the Acting Secretary to take the official government actions at issue.
Their complaint simply lacks the connective tissue required to draw that inference. There is also an “obvious alternative explanation” for these officials’ actions.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009). As the record shows, DACA has long been politically controversial. It “should come as no surprise,” id., that wellknown policy differences would lead cabinet officials in
a new administration to change a controversial government policy. See Memorandum from John Kelly, Secretary, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., “Enforcement of the
Immigration Laws to Serve the National Interest” 2
(Feb. 20, 2017) (setting out the Administration’s new enforcement policies and stating “the Department no
longer will exempt classes or categories of removable al-
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iens from potential enforcement”). Changes in government policy are perfectly lawful, and for a selectiveprosecution claim, we must presume that the Attorney
General and the Acting Secretary were motivated by
such a lawful purpose. AAADC, 525 U.S. at 489. The
plaintiffs allege no facts plausibly displacing that presumption.
In short, the plaintiffs have presented no evidence
that racial motivations played any part in either the former Attorney General’s advice or the former Acting
Secretary’s decision to rescind DACA. Therefore, I
would dismiss the equal protection claim.
IV.

Information-Sharing Policy

The Majority is correct that the plaintiffs’ estoppel
claim against the Department is baseless. The availability of equitable estoppel against the government is
controversial under any circumstances. See Office of
Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 419-21 (1990).
The issue remains unresolved by the Supreme Court.
See id. at 423. And we have recognized that if such
a doctrine is ever justified in this context, there must
be “affirmative misconduct by government agents.”
Dawkins v. Witt, 318 F.3d 606, 611 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing
INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973)).
In any case, the mere fact that the Department explicitly told applicants that its information-sharing policy “may be modified, superseded, or rescinded at any
time” and that the policy “may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit,” J.A. 1004, is enough to end our
analysis. There was nothing for the plaintiffs to rely
on for the proposition that their information was immune from disclosure.
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Additionally, even if the doctrine of estoppel applied
here, that would not justify the district court’s nationwide injunction. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916,
1930-31, 1934 (2018); Virginia Society for Human Life,
Inc. v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379, 394 (4th Cir. 2001) (abrogated
on other grounds). This potent judicial tool was largely
unheard-of until the mid-twentieth century. Samuel L.
Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National
Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 428 (2017). These
broad injunctions pose many drawbacks that can quickly
outweigh their benefits, particularly when they are overused (and overused repeatedly). Among other things,
such injunctions sharpen plaintiffs’ incentives to forumshop while inhibiting the proper ventilation of difficult
legal issues by deterring other lower courts from grappling with them. See id. at 460-61. Under our decentralized and multifaceted judicial system, judges must
scrutinize the scope of the injunctive remedies they
fashion. Even assuming a nationwide injunction could
be appropriate in some case, an injunction that is limited
to the plaintiffs should generally suffice.
*

*

*

We in the Judicial Branch have a narrowly circumscribed role. It is not our place to second-guess the
wisdom of the discretionary decisions made by the other
Branches. The rescission of DACA was a controversial
and contentious decision, but one that was committed to
the Executive Branch. For this reason, I respectfully
dissent.
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APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Civil No. RWT-17-2942
CASA DE MARYLAND, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS

Filed: Mar. 5, 2018
MEMORANDUM OPINION

On October 5, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint seeking to enjoin rescission of a program known as Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”), asserting a variety of claims as to why the rescission was unlawful.
See ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs are a number of individual
participants in that program known as “Dreamers,” as
well as a series of special interest organizations that deal
with immigration policy issues and work directly with
immigrants in the community. Id. at 11-21. Defendants are President Donald Trump, Attorney General
Jeff Sessions, and a series of government agencies—the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”)—as well as
each agency’s acting leader (secretary, director, or commissioner). Defendants collectively will be referred to
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as the “Government.” Each individual defendant is being sued in his or her official capacity. Id. at 21-22.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges a number of causes of
action—both administrative and constitutional—which
they believe are proper grounds for relief. Plaintiffs
assert that rescission of the DACA program was unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)
both (1) as an arbitrary and capricious decision and
(2) for failure to follow notice-and-comment procedures.
Id. at 54-58. Plaintiffs further allege that the DACA
rescission was a violation of the Fifth Amendment on the
grounds of procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection. Id. at 49-54. Plaintiffs
seek injunctive relief on the basis of equitable estoppel
both as to the DACA rescission itself and its information
sharing policy. Id. at 58-59. Lastly, Plaintiffs seek
declaratory relief that the DACA program is lawful.
Id. at 59-60.
On November 1, 2017, the Court held an in-person
status conference in order to resolve the scheduling and
logistical issues of this case. ECF No. 19. Thereafter
on November 15, 2017, the Government filed a Motion to
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment.
ECF No. 27. On November 28, 2017, Plaintiffs responded in opposition, ECF No. 29, and on December 5, 2017,
the Government replied in support of its Motion, ECF
No. 30. The Court issued an Order on December 11,
2017 giving notice to the parties in accordance with Rule
56(f ) that it may grant summary judgment for the nonmoving party. See ECF No. 31. On December 15, 2017,
the Court held a hearing on the Motion. ECF No. 34.
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I.

BACKGROUND

“Can we all get along?”—Rodney King1

In recent years, many Americans have found themselves sharing Mr. King’s sentiment. This Court previously noted, albeit in the context of congressional gerrymandering, that “[n]ever before has the United States
seen such deep political divisions as exist today, and
while the courts are struggling in their efforts to find a
standard [for the adjudication of gerrymandering claims],
the fires of excessive partisanship are burning and our
national government is encountering deadlock as never
before.” Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 905
(D. Md. 2011) (Titus, J., concurring), aff ’d, 567 U.S. 930
(2012). Unfortunately, that 2011 observation still holds
true today—perhaps even more so.
This case is yet another example of the damaging fallout that results from excessive political partisanship.
The highly politicized debate surrounding the DACA
program has thus far produced only rancor and accusations. During the recent debate over the rescission of
DACA, the program even turned into a bargaining chip
that resulted in a brief shutdown of the entire federal
government earlier this year.2 In order to adequately resolve the legal issues of this case, it is important to step
back from the heated rhetoric and understand the context
under which DACA was promulgated and rescinded.
See Richard A. Serrano, Rodney King: ‘Truth will come out’,
L.A. Times (May 2, 1992), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/
la-me-king-case-aftermath-city-in-crisis-19920502-story.html.
2
See Gregory Krieg, The DACA shutdown is over. Now What?,
CNN (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/22/politics/
shutdown-immigration-daca-outcomes/index.html.
1
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The Dream Act—a Lengthy History of Failed Legislation

The Constitution reserves the power to enact immigration policy to the legislative branch. U.S. Const.
art. I, § 8 (“[T]o establish a uniform rule of naturalization”). However, the “supervision of the admission of
aliens into the United States may be intrusted by [C]ongress” to the executive branch. Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). For over a decade at the start of the 21st century, Congress quarreled
over policies regarding illegal aliens who entered the country as children, and who may have no memory or connection with their country of origin. Would the world’s beacon of freedom—a nation founded by immigrants—cast
out an immigrant population that was likely brought here
without choice and who likely now knows no other home?
While “no” would seem to be the obvious answer, ordinary logic has eluded our Congress.
“Dreamers” are neither constitutionally nor statutorily defined. Rather, the concept of protection for
“Dreamers” arises from repeated congressional failures
to act, and presidential action taken in their wake. A
series of congressional sessions marked by bitter strife
and inaction left the country without any protections for
persons brought here illegally as children. The first
attempt at a Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (“DREAM”) Act came in 2001, and although
it took on many names in subsequent years, the repeated attempts to pass this legislation were filibustered, abandoned, or defeated on the floor. 3 As illustrated by the frequency of bills proposed, Dreamer
See Immigrant Children’s Educational Advancement and Dropout Prevention Act of 2001, H.R. 1582, 107th Cong. (2001); Student
3
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legislation reached its zenith during late 2010 in the
111th Session of Congress. On December 8, 2010, the
House of Representatives actually passed the DREAM
Act.4 However, like all other iterations of this controversial legislation, its fate was doomed—this time, less
than two weeks later on the Senate floor. 5
DACA—an Act of Desperation Born of Frustration with a
Paralyzed Congress

President Obama’s administration, faced with the reality that Congress could do little more than squabble
regarding the Dreamers, decided to take action on its
own. On June 15, 2012, then-Secretary of Homeland
Security, Janet Napolitano, issued a memorandum promulgating by executive action what is now known as

Adjustment Act of 2001, H.R. 1918, 107th Cong. (2001); DREAM
Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2002); DREAM Act, S. 1545, 108th Cong.
(2003); DREAM Act of 2005, S. 2075, 109th Cong. (2005); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006);
American Dream Act, H.R. 5131, 109th Cong. (2006); DREAM Act,
S. 2205, 110th Cong. (2007); Comprehensive Immigration Reform
Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007); DREAM Act of 2009, S. 729,
111th Cong. (2009); DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3827, 111th Cong. (2010);
DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3962, 111th Cong. (2010); DREAM Act of
2010, S. 3963, 111th Cong. (2010); DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3992,
111th Cong. (2010); DREAM Act of 2010, H.R. 6497, 111th Cong.
(2010); DREAM Act of 2011, S. 952, 112th Cong. (2011).
4
See John Brandt, House Passes DREAM Act Immigration
Measures, Fox News (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/
2010/12/08/house-passes-dream-act-immigration-measures.html.
5
See DREAM Act Goes Down in Flames in Senate, Fox News
(Dec. 18, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/12/18/senatetries-pass-dream-act.html.
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DACA (“DACA Memo”). 6 DACA protections were afforded to the same class of immigrants foreseen by the
various failed iterations of Dreamer legislation. The
primary qualifications for DACA protections were that
an individual must (1) have come to the U.S. before the
age of sixteen, (2) meet various education or military
service requirements, (3) not have a criminal record, and
(4) register prior to the age of thirty.7
DACA was issued under a theory of “prosecutorial
discretion” and “deferred action” and essentially permitted otherwise illegal aliens to remain in the United
States without fear of deportation.8 While some heralded DACA as a victory, others decried it as executive
overreach—usurping the powers of Congress to promulgate immigration policy. 9 Over the course of the next
five years, approximately 800,000 Dreamers registered
for DACA protections.
Phase II: DAPA

Soon thereafter, the executive branch sought to expand its use of deferred action beyond the Dreamers.
On November 20, 2014, then-Secretary of Homeland Security, Jeh Charles Johnson, issued a pair of memoranda in an attempt to promulgate what is now known
Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to
the United States as Children (June 15, 2012).
7
See id.
6

See id.
See Obama suspends deportation for thousands of illegals, tells
GOP to pass DREAM Act, Fox News (June 15, 2012), http://www.
foxnews.com/politics/2012/06/15/obama-administration-to-offerimmunity-to-younger-immigrants.html.
8
9
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as Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (“DAPA”),
as well as a series of minor expansions for DACA.10
Less than a month later, DAPA was met with a legal
challenge when Texas and twenty-five other states sued
to enjoin implementation of the program. See generally Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex.
2015). In that case, DAPA was struck down by the district court, see id., and a divided Fifth Circuit panel affirmed the decision, see 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). In
June 2016, an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed
the decision. See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct.
2271, 2272 (2016). In addition to finding DAPA and the
expansions of DACA unlawful, the judicial decisions
throughout the DAPA litigation illustrate two key realities: (1) challenges to DAPA or analogous immigration
programs promulgated by DHS without approval by
Congress are justiciable; and (2) reasonable legal minds
may differ regarding their lawfulness.
Aside from the classes of immigrants to which each
applies, DACA and DAPA are largely similar programs
addressing different classes or subcategories of immigrants. While DACA affects a population of approximately 800,000 otherwise illegal aliens, DAPA would
have affected nearly half of the 11,000,000 immigrants
currently in the United States unlawfully. See Texas v.
United States, 787 F.3d 733, 745 (5th Cir. 2015). DAPA
Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Policies for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014); Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to
Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014).
10
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was challenged and defeated before the program was
ever successfully promulgated, while DACA has run for
approximately half of a decade before the threat of any
litigation.
A Change in Administration and a Corresponding Change
in Immigration Philosophy

The 2016 presidential election brought a change in
leadership of the executive branch and, with it, significant
changes in immigration views and philosophies. 11 In
June of 2017, and with the defeat of DAPA directly in
the rear-view mirror, Texas and other state plaintiffs
sent a letter threatening to challenge DACA if it were
not rescinded by September 6, 2017. 12 Attorney General Jeff Sessions advised the Acting Secretary of
Homeland Security, Elaine Duke, that DACA was likely
unlawful and headed for another legal battle. 13 On September 5, 2017, Acting Secretary Duke issued a memorandum (“DACA Rescission Memo”) outlining a sixmonth wind down of DACA to expire March 5, 2018.14
According to the Administrative Record, the basis for
the decision to rescind DACA was its presumed unlawfulness in the wake of the DAPA litigation and the threat
of imminent legal challenge. The agency’s reasoning is

See, e.g., Tessa Berenson, Middle Schoolers in Michigan Chant
‘Build That Wall’ After Trump Victory, TIME (Nov. 11, 2016),
http://time.com/4567812/donald-trump-middle-school-build-wall/.
12
See Admin. R., ECF No. 26-1 at 238-40.
13
See Admin. R., ECF No. 26-1 at 251.
14
Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Rescission of
the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled “Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United
States as Children” (Sept. 5, 2017).
11
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substantiated by the legal advice of the Attorney General and the fact that the memorandum was issued the
day before the state parties had threatened to act. A
six-month wind down period was provided to avoid the
potential for chaos if a court decision resulted in immediate termination, and the President urged Congress to
pass Dreamer-protection legislation. 15
Complicating the picture for some observers is the
unfortunate and often inflammatory rhetoric used by
President Trump during the campaign, as well as his
Twitter pronouncements, both before and after his election. Thoughtful and careful judicial review is not
aided when the President lobs verbal hand grenades at
the federal courts, the Department of Justice, and anyone else with whom he disagrees.
As disheartening or inappropriate as the President’s
occasionally disparaging remarks may be, they are not
relevant to the larger issues governing the DACA rescission. The DACA Rescission Memo is clear as to its
purpose and reasoning, and its decision is rationally supported by the Administrative Record. See generally
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (“[W]hen
the Executive exercises [a congressionally delegated
power of immigration policies and rules for the exclusion
of aliens] negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate
and bona fide reason, the courts will [not] look behind
the exercise of that discretion.”); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557, 623-24 n.52 (2006) (“We have not heretofore,

See Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves
to End DACA and Calls on Congress to Act, N.Y. Times (Sept. 5,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/us/politics/trump-dacadreamers-immigration.html.
15
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in evaluating the legality of executive action, deferred to
comments made by such officials to the media.”). 16
The executive branch may have the authority to exercise or not exercise prosecutorial discretion as it sees
fit, and an agency certainly may refrain from action it
reasonably believes to be unlawful. Under the Constitution, it is the responsibility of Congress to determine
immigration policy, and the executive branch must only
act within its constitutional and delegated legislative authority. Although Congress has repeatedly failed to
pass Dreamer legislation in the past, the ball is again in
its court. And with 87 percent of Americans favoring
some sort of DACA-esque protections, the elected members of Congress should understandably feel the pressure now that the President has deferred to them—in
short, Congress needs to get the job done now that their

See also Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir.
2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting):
16

Even if a politician’s past statements were utterly clear and consistent, using them to yield a specific constitutional violation
would suggest an absurd result—namely, that the policies of an
elected official can be forever held hostage by the unguarded
declarations of a candidate. If a court were to find that campaign skeletons prevented an official from pursuing otherwise
constitutional policies, what could he do to cure the defect?
Could he stand up and recant it all (“just kidding!”) and try
again? Or would we also need a court to police the sincerity of
that mea culpa—piercing into the public official’s “heart of
hearts” to divine whether he really changed his mind, just as the
Supreme Court has warned us not to? See McCreary, 545 U.S.
at 862, 125 S. Ct. 2722.
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authority has been recognized by court decisions and
the President.17
Other DACA Litigation

Various plaintiffs have filed lawsuits seeking to enjoin
the DACA rescission throughout the country—specifically
in this Court, the Eastern District of New York, the
Northern District of California, and the District of the
District of Columbia.
These cases are at various
stages, but preliminary injunctions have already been
granted by the Eastern District of New York and the
Northern District of California. 18 With regard to the
California case, the Government attempted to bypass
the Ninth Circuit and directly petitioned the Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari before judgment. 19 On
February 26, 2018, the Supreme Court denied the petition without prejudice, and noted that “[i]t is assumed
that the Court of Appeals [for the Ninth Circuit] will
proceed expeditiously to decide this case.” 20

See Jennifer De Pinto, Fred Backus, Kabir Khanna & Anthony
Salvanto, Most Americans support DACA, but oppose border wall,
CBS News (Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mostamericans-support-daca-but-oppose-border-wall-cbs-news-poll/.
18
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
No. CV 17-05211 WHA, 2018 WL 339144 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2018);
Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, No. CV 16-4756 NGG JO, 2018 WL 834074
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2018).
19
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
No. CV 17-05211 WHA, 2018 WL 339144 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2018),
petition for cert. before judgment filed, 2018 WL 509822 (U.S. Jan
18, 2018) (No. 17-1003).
20
Docket, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., No. 17-1003, (U.S. Feb. 26, 2018).
17
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All courts reviewing the DACA rescission would benefit from a prior generation’s wisdom regarding the separation of powers: “A sturdy judiciary should not be
swayed by the unpleasantness or unpopularity of necessary executive action, but must independently determine for itself whether the President was acting, as required by the Constitution, to ‘take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.’ ” Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 709 (1952). 21
The decisions to date by courts in California and New
York are premised on the legal conclusion that DACA is
lawful, and therefore, a decision to rescind DACA on the
basis of unlawfulness is necessarily arbitrary and capricious. Respectfully, this Court disagrees. Regardless of the lawfulness of DACA, the appropriate inquiry
is whether or not DHS made a reasoned decision to rescind DACA based on the Administrative Record. Any
alternative inquiry would impermissibly require a court
to “substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” See
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Given the fate of

Or, more directly, as Judge Niemeyer notes in his recent dissent
in the “travel ban” case.
21

The public debate over the Administration’s foreign policy and,
in particular, its immigration policy, is indeed intense and
thereby seductively tempts courts to effect a politically preferred
result when confronted with such issues. But public respect for
Article III courts calls for heightened discipline and sharpened
focus on only the applicable legal principles to avoid substituting
judicial judgment for that of elected representatives.
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. 17-2231, 2018 WL
894413, at *104 (4th Cir. Feb. 15, 2018) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
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DAPA, the legal advice provided by the Attorney General, and the threat of imminent litigation, it was reasonable for DHS to have concluded—right or wrong—that
DACA was unlawful and should be wound down in an
orderly manner. Therefore, its decision to rescind
DACA cannot be arbitrary and capricious.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is “to test the sufficiency of a
complaint.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d
231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court has further articulated the standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6)
motions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009);
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Rule 8 “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556 n.3. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must put forth “plausible claim[s] for relief.” Francis
v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). “But
where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that
the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Motion to Dismiss.

Motion for Summary Judgment.
Summary judgment is proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56(a) if there
is no genuine dispute over any material facts, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Francis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 302
(4th Cir. 2006). A material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
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dispute of material fact is genuine if the evidence would
allow the trier of fact to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. When considering a summary judgment
motion, the court has “an affirmative obligation . . .
to prevent ‘factually unsupported claims or defenses’
from proceeding to trial.” Felty v. Grave-Humphreys
Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex,
477 U.S. at 323-24). Thus, the court may only rely on
facts supported in the record, not assertions made in the
pleading. Id. Moreover, the court must view all facts
and make all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
The nonmoving party must present more than a “mere
scintilla” of evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of
material fact that would preclude summary judgment.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
III. ANALYSIS
a.

Justiciability

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Congress has
the authority to expand or limit federal district court jurisdiction by statute. However, federal courts possess
an inherent jurisdiction (under Article III and the fundamental principles of due process) over certain cases
relating to the enforcement of the Constitution that cannot be limited by Congress. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (permitting federal district
court jurisdiction when necessary “to avoid the serious
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constitutional question that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.”).
The Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal
courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2. However, federal courts may only review
“cases and controversies” if they are justiciable. See
generally Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-99 (1968) (discussing the doctrine of justiciability as “a blend of constitutional requirements and policy considerations”).
A case may lack justiciability when it involves a political
question and implicates concerns regarding the separation of powers between the judiciary and one of the other
branches of government. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) (“Deciding whether a matter
has in any measure been committed by the Constitution
to another branch of government, or whether the action
of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been
committed . . . is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”). While executive actions may often involve otherwise unreviewable
political questions, federal courts always retain the power
to review matters of constitutional violations. See id.
Accordingly, the Court need not reach back to Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), to support the conclusion
that Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are justiciable.
Turning to Plaintiffs’ remaining claims, the Court is
required to determine if judicial review has been limited
by Congress under the APA. The plain language of the
APA—specifically, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702—indicates a presumption for judicial review, at least to the procedures
surrounding agency decision-making (but not necessarily
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to the substance of those decisions). See generally Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (restating
“the basic presumption of judicial review” for APA claims
“so long as no statute precludes such relief or the action
is not one committed by law to agency discretion”).22 Under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a), the only two exceptions are when:
“(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.”
The Government argues both exceptions—that
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) precludes judicial review, and that the
DACA rescission is “committed to agency discretion”
because it is a matter of prosecutorial discretion, see
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996),
immigration enforcement, see Arizona v. United States,
567 U.S. 387, 396-97 (2012), and deferred action generally, see Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.
(AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 485 (1999). See ECF No. 27-1
at 29-30.
However, the notion that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) precludes judicial review has been rejected repeatedly.
See, e.g., AADC, 525 U.S. at 482 (explicitly rejecting that
§ 1252(g) serves as a zipper clause that functions to prohibit all judicial review). Furthermore, while DHS possesses specified delegated authority over immigration
enforcement, Congress never explicitly granted DHS a
blanket authority to disparately enforce policies.
abrogated on other grounds by statute, Pub. L. 94-574, 90 Stat.
2721, as recognized in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977)
(finding the statutory amendment to “eliminate the requirement of
a specified amount in controversy as a prerequisite to the maintenance of any (§ 1331) action brought against the United States, any
agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official
capacity”).
22
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Plaintiffs’ APA claims are justiciable because they
relate to the procedures followed by DHS—not to the
substance of its policy or its decision of a specific case.
The Court may review whether the repeal of DACA followed the correct APA procedures. Furthermore, it is
important to note that the Government’s explanation for
rescinding DACA was the Secretary’s belief that the
program was unlawful and would face lengthy legal challenges. The similarities between DACA and DAPA support justiciability in this case because review of DAPA
was also found to be justiciable. See Texas v. United
States, 809 F.3d 134, 155-64 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Congress
has expressly limited or precluded judicial review of
many immigration decisions . . . but DAPA is not
one of them.”), aff ’d, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 23

See also Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 165-170 (5th Cir.
2015), aff ’d, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016).
23

Congress did not intend to make immune from judicial review an
agency action that reclassifies millions of illegal aliens in a way
that imposes substantial costs on states that have relied on
the protections conferred by § 1621. . . . Chaney’s presumption against judicial review of agency inaction [exists] because
there are no meaningful standards against which to judge the
agency’s exercise of discretion. But where there is affirmative
agency action—as with DAPA’s issuance of lawful presence and
employment authorization—and in light of the INA’s intricate
regulatory scheme for changing immigration classifications and
issuing employment authorization, the action at least can be reviewed to determine whether the agency exceeded its statutory
powers. . . .
At its core, this case is about the Secretary’s decision to change
the immigration classification of millions of illegal aliens on a
class-wide basis. The states properly maintain that DAPA’s
grant of lawful presence and accompanying eligibility for bene-
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Accordingly, the Court finds all claims in Plaintiffs’
Complaint are justiciable.
b.

Standing

Direct standing exists for plaintiffs who have an
injury-in-fact that is traceable to the defendants and
which is redressable through adjudication. See Lujan
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 590 (1992). The injury must be more than a generalized grievance, which
is an ideological objection or an injury widely shared by
all members of the public. See id. at 575. Organizations have direct standing when government action has
impaired the organization’s own legal rights. See, e.g.,
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S.
333, 342 (U.S. 1977). However, association standing
also exists for organizational plaintiffs when (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own
right, (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane
to the purpose of the organization, and (3) neither the
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. See id.
at 343.
The Government does not contest the standing of the
individual plaintiffs. However, it argues that the organizational plaintiffs lack direct standing because they
are not “the object of any government policy” and are
fits is a substantive rule that must go through notice and comment, before it imposes substantial costs on them, and that
DAPA is substantively contrary to law. The federal courts are
fully capable of adjudicating those disputes. Because the interests that Texas seeks to protect are within the INA’s zone of interests, and judicial review is available, we address whether
Texas has established a substantial likelihood of success on its
claim that DAPA must be submitted for notice and comment.
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merely seeking to “vindicate their own value preferences.” See ECF No. 27-1 at 38-39 (equating the organizational plaintiffs’ injury to a mere “generalized
grievance”). The Government also argues that the organizational plaintiffs lack representational standing for
failing to identify members of their organizations who
are directly harmed by the repeal of DACA, see id. at
41-42, or reside within DACA’s zone-of-interests, see id.
at 42 (citing Clarke v. Secs. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388,
395-96 (1987)).
The Government’s challenges to the standing of the
organizational plaintiffs miss the mark. Casa De Maryland and the rest of the organizational plaintiffs are
special interest groups directly focused on aiding immigrants and their communities. The fact that one of
their primary functions has been assisting their members with “tens of thousands of DACA initial and renewal applications” is sufficient for standing in and of
itself. See ECF No. 29 at 33. In addition to direct
standing, the organizational plaintiffs possess association standing. Each organization has identified a number of its members who are Dreamers, and who unquestionably would have standing in this case. Furthermore, the purpose of these organizations is to aid and
represent immigrants in their communities, including
compliance with immigration procedures. Therefore,
the rescission of DACA has an absolute nexus to the organizations’ purpose. Additionally, the relief sought is
injunctive and declaratory relief—not damages or any
other remedy requiring the individual Dreamers.
Hence, these organizational plaintiffs are the prototypical examples of possessing association standing.
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Accordingly, the Court finds all Plaintiffs have standing in the instant case.
c.

APA Claims

Rulemaking is a common method federal agencies
use to promulgate decisions. See generally Bi-Metallic
Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46
(1915); Londoner v. City & Cty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373,
385 (1908). Informal rulemaking is standardized under
the APA and requires notice-and-comment procedures.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553; e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia
Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 253 (2d Cir. 1977). Informal rulemaking does not include non-legislative rulemaking, such as procedural rules, interpretive rules, or
policy statements. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b); e.g., McLouth
Steel Prod. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1324-25
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
After the notice-and-comment requirements, if applicable, have been met, courts must take a hard look at
whether the decision to promulgate or repeal a rule is
“arbitrary or capricious”—which is to say that there
must be a rational correlation between the facts reviewed
and the decision made. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n
of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
42-44 (1983) (explaining that an agency must examine
relevant data, articulate a satisfactory explanation contemporaneously with its decision, using rationale that
comes from the agency (and not from a court inferring
after the fact logic that is not explicitly stated in the
record)). See id. However, even when notice-andcomment requirements do not apply, agency decisions
are subject to judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 706. By
statute, “[t]he reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
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found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”
5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
The DACA program is a deferral of action, which by
definition is an exercise of discretion rather than a rule
with the force of law. Furthermore, the DACA Rescission Memo was not immediately binding, but rather a
statement of intended policy beginning March 5, 2018.
To the extent that Plaintiffs aver that, in practice, immigration reviews absent DACA protections lack individualized discretion, their dispute is merely with how the
agency applies its policy, and not with the policy itself.24
Although a substantial paradigm shift, the DACA Rescission Memo neither curtails DHS’s discretion regarding individual immigration reviews, nor does it prevent
the agency from granting Dreamers deferred action status again in the future. Hence, DACA and its rescission are more akin to non-binding policy statements, and
thus not subject to notice-and-comment requirements.
Plaintiffs argue that the decision to rescind DACA
must be arbitrary and capricious because the Administrative Record is “insufficient” to make a decision of such
magnitude. See ECF No. 29 at 35-39 (noting that the
Administrative Record is only 256 pages long—192 of
which are court opinions related to DAPA); see also In
re United States, No. 17-72917, 2017 WL 5505730, at *2
(9th Cir. Nov. 16, 2017) (“The notion that the head of a

Plaintiffs’ APA claim regarding DACA’s information sharing
policy also lacks merit. Nothing in the DACA Rescission Memo
outlines any change—let alone implements a substantive rule—with
regard to the use of any individual’s information gathered during
DACA’s implementation.
24

83a
United States agency would decide to terminate a program giving legal protection to roughly 800,000 people
based on 256 pages of publicly available documents is
not credible.”).
However, based on the historical and political context outlined in the introductory pages of this Opinion,
the decision to rescind DACA was neither arbitrary nor
capricious, but rather was a carefully crafted decision
supported by the Administrative Record. It is well established that “[t]he scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is
not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”
State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Therefore, it is irrelevant whether this Court, a judge in California or
New York, or even a justice on the Supreme Court might
have made a different decision while standing in the
shoes of DHS on September 5, 2017. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the decision was made with a
“satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
DHS’s rationale provided in the DACA Rescission
Memo was a belief, based on recent court decisions and
the advice of the Attorney General, that DACA was unlawful. Assuming that a reasonable basis for that belief
exists in the Administrative Record, how could trying to
avoid unlawful action possibly be arbitrary and capricious? Quite simply, it cannot. Regardless of whether
DACA is, in fact, lawful or unlawful, the belief that it was
unlawful and subject to serious legal challenge is completely rational.
DAPA—an analogous program, promulgated by analogous means—had been defeated less than a year prior.
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The litigation that stopped DAPA included expansions
of DACA itself. The same plaintiffs who defeated DAPA
threatened to challenge DACA imminently. The Attorney General of the United States—the nation’s chief
legal officer—provided legal advice that DACA was likewise unlawful and likely ill-fated against a legal challenge.
All of this is in the Administrative Record—the remnants
of the DAPA litigation,25 the threatened legal challenge,26
and the Attorney General’s advisory letter. 27
Therefore, what did the Acting Secretary of DHS
do? She opted for a six-month wind-down period instead of the chaotic possibility of an immediate termination, which would come at a time known only to the judge
resolving a future challenge to the DACA program.
This decision took control of a pell-mell situation and
provided Congress—the branch of government charged
with determining immigration policy—an opportunity to
remedy it. Given the reasonable belief that DACA was
unlawful, the decision to wind down DACA in an orderly
manner was rational.
Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ APA claims
to lack merit; the rescission of DACA neither required
notice-and-comment procedures, nor was it decided arbitrarily or capriciously.
d.

Equal Protection

Equal protection is the legal mechanism by which
the law prevents disparate treatment between groups.
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
25
26
27

See Admin. R., ECF No. 26-1 at 42-228.
See Admin. R., ECF No. 26-1 at 238-40.
See Admin. R., ECF No. 26-1 at 251.
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432, 439 (1985). A violative statute or action may provide for disparate treatment facially or in its application.
See id. at 447-48. In reviewing legislation, which creates disparate impacts ‘as applied,’ courts review whether
the action is covertly based on a suspect classification or
if it can be plausibly explained on neutral grounds. See
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). Probative considerations include a history of hostility towards the group, the sequence of events leading to the government action, departures from previous policies, and the legislative history. See id. at 265-67. The level of judicial scrutiny
depends on the nature of the class targeted for disparate
treatment.
The Complaint asserts that strict scrutiny should apply because the disparate treatment allegedly involves
suspect classes—race, alienage, and national origin.
See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 84 (1979)
(finding alienage as a suspect class). When strict scrutiny applies, the government has the burden to demonstrate a compelling state interest, for which the governmental action is narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin,
570 U.S. 297, 308 (2013).
The Government’s equal protection argument analogizes the rescission of DACA to “selective prosecution”
—which is afforded a presumption of non-discriminatory
motives absent “clear evidence to the contrary.” See
ECF No. 27-1 at 58-61 (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-68 (1996) where the court denied discovery on a selective prosecution claim regarding 24 drug-trafficking offenses (all of which were against
African-American defendants)). Plaintiffs correctly note
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that the Armstrong court accepted the proposition that
“the decision whether to prosecute may not be based on
an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other
arbitrary classification.” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464
(1996). Plaintiffs aver that the DACA rescission was “a
discriminatory policy decision (not a challenge to a particular prosecution) that has a discriminatory impact
and was motivated by discriminatory animus.” See ECF
No. 29 at 55 (noting that Hispanics comprise 93 percent
of the 800,000 immigrants affected by DACA). To substantiate their claim, Plaintiffs cite to some of President
Trump’s unfortunate, less-than-politically-correct, statements. See ECF No. 29 at 54.
Both sides miss the mark. While DACA was promulgated under a theory of prosecutorial discretion, its
rescission was not based on an exercise of that discretion. Rather, its rescission was premised on a legitimate belief that DACA was unlawful and should be
wound down in an orderly manner, while giving Congress a window to act and adopt an appropriate legislative solution. The Administrative Record—the basis
from which the Court must make its judicial review—
does not support the notion that it was targeting a subset of the immigrant population, and it does not support
any supposition that the decision was derived on a racial
animus. That is where the judicial inquiry should end.
The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ reliance on the President’s misguided, inconsistent, and occasionally irrational comments made to the media to establish an
ulterior motive. See generally Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (finding that courts should defer
to any “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for executive action and not “look behind the exercise of that
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discretion”); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 623-24
n.52 (2006) (noting that courts have never, “in evaluating
the legality of executive action, deferred to comments
made by such officials to the media”); County of
McCreary v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 845
(2005) (warning courts, albeit in the context of the First
Amendment, to refrain from “scrutinizing purpose”
when it requires “judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s
heart of hearts”). 28
Although the DACA Rescission Memo is facially
clear as to its purpose and reasoning, Plaintiffs urge the
Court to look behind it and find an allegedly discriminatory motivation—one that Plaintiffs attempt to establish
with some of the President’s remarks and statements.
However, Plaintiffs here fail to make the necessary factual showing to permit this Court to do so. Albeit in
the context of an Establishment Clause challenge, the
Fourth Circuit recently explained in the “travel ban”
case that there is “a heavy burden on Plaintiffs, but not
See also Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. 17-2231,
2018 WL 894413, at *102 (4th Cir. Feb. 15, 2018) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting):
28

Because of their nature, campaign statements and other similar
statements, including Tweets, are unbounded resources by
which to find intent of various kinds. They are often short-hand
for larger ideas; they are explained, modified, retracted, and amplified as they are repeated and as new circumstances and arguments arise. And they are often susceptible to multiple interpretations, depending on the outlook of the recipient. . . . At
bottom, the danger of this new rule is that it will enable a court
to justify its decision to strike down any executive action with
which it disagrees. It need only find one statement that contradicts the official reasons given for a subsequent executive action
and thereby pronounce that the official reasons were a pretext.
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an insurmountable one [in seeking to introduce such
statements]. [Precedent] clearly affords the political
branches substantial deference,” but “also accounts for
those very rare instances in which a challenger plausibly
alleges that a government action runs so contrary to the
basic premises of our Constitution as to warrant more
probing review.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v.
Trump, No. 17-2231, 2018 WL 894413, at *12 (4th Cir.
Feb. 15, 2018) (reviewing the standard set forth in
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) “through the
lens of Justice Kennedy’s [concurring] opinion in” Kerry
v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015)).
In that case, Chief Judge Gregory, writing for the
majority, explained that Mandel requires courts to
“first ask whether the proffered reason for the Proclamation is ‘facially legitimate and bona fide.’ ” Id. (citing Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770). Under Din, however, a
district court “may ‘look behind’ the Government’s proffered justification for its action” upon “an ‘affirmative
showing of bad faith,’ which [plaintiffs] must ‘plausibly
allege with sufficient particularity.’ ” Id. (citing Din,
135 S. Ct. at 2139-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). However, while the plaintiffs in the “travel ban” case offered
“undisputed evidence” of an “anti-Muslim bias,” see id.
at *13, the Plaintiffs cannot here make a similarly substantial showing. The Fourth Circuit found that thencandidate Trump regularly disparaged Islam as a religion and repeatedly proposed banning Muslims from the
United States. See id. at *13-*16. Implicit to the issue was a direct nexus between the discriminatory statements and the executive action in question in that case—
a travel ban targeting predominantly Muslim nations.
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The instant case is factually very different. The
President certainly made statements of his strong views
on immigration policy, including advocacy for the rescission of the DACA program. 29 However, his statements
have frequently shifted but have moderated since his
election. He has referred to the Dreamers as “terrific
people;” he has pledged to “show great heart;” and he
has referred to Dreamers as “incredible kids.” 30 He referred to the “DACA situation” as a “very difficult thing
for me. Because, you know, I love these kids.” 31 He
added that “the existing law is very rough. It’s very,
very rough.”32
The rescission of the DACA program merely fulfills
the duty of the executive branch to faithfully enforce the
laws passed by Congress. Accordingly, no affirmative
showing of bad faith can follow. In fact, the President
actually urged Congress to pass Dreamer-protection
legislation during DACA’s wind down period 33—simply
put, this case is wholly dissimilar to the “extraordinary
case” regarding the recent “travel ban.” 34 As a result,

See Gregory Krieg, Trump’s many shifting positions on DACA,
from the campaign to right now, CNN (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.
cnn.com/2018/01/25/politics/donald-trump-positions-daca/index.html.
30
See id.
31
See id.
32
See id.
33
See supra Note 15.
34
Accord Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. 17-2231,
2018 WL 894413, at *13 (4th Cir. Feb. 15, 2018) (“In the extraordinary case before us, resolution of that question [regarding pretext]
presents little difficulty. Unlike Din and Mandel, in which the Government had a “bona fide factual basis” for its actions, Din, 135 S. Ct.
29
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the Court need not go further than the facially legitimate motivation offered in the DACA Rescission Memo
and supported by the Administrative Record.
Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ equal protection claims to lack merit
e.

Procedural Due Process

Procedural due process ensures that the government
must satisfy certain procedures prior to depriving a
person of his or her rights. See Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976). Procedural due process
applies whenever the government seeks to deprive a
person of a liberty or property interest. See id. Liberty
interests include physical restraint, a substantial infringement of a fundamental right, harm to one’s reputation affecting another tangible interest, or the unjustified intrusion of one’s personal security. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980). Property interests include real property, personal property, intellectual property, or any legitimate claim of entitlement.
See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
429 (1982). Entitlements—rights to things like education, public employment, and welfare—are grounded in
the law and cannot be removed except for cause. See id.
In determining the amount of process owed, courts balance (1) the importance of the right the individual is trying to preserve, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of
that right given the existing level of due process, and
(3) the level of governmental burden for the additional

at 2140 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment), here the Government’s proffered rationale for the Proclamation lies at odds with the
statements of the President himself.”).
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levels of due process sought.
334-35.

See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at

Plaintiffs allege that under DACA, Dreamers were
afforded, and are now being deprived of, a number of
protected interests, including the ability to (1) obtain
employment authorization, (2) travel internationally,
(3) attend schools, (4) pay into and receive payment from
Social Security and disability, (5) secure other opportunities like obtaining bank accounts or credit cards, and
(6) otherwise be considered “lawfully present.” See
ECF No. 29 at 58.
First, Plaintiffs’ claim fails because procedural due
process only applies to individualized deprivations, not
policy-based deprivations for an entire class. See BiMetallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S.
441, 445 (1915) (holding that individualized hearings are
unnecessary when impractical and when the challenged
policy affects a large number of people; in these instances, the political process serves as an effective alternative).
Second, even assuming arguendo that due process
did attach to class-wide policy deprivations, Plaintiffs’
due process claim would fail because DACA did not create an entitlement. Facially, the June 15, 2012 DACA
Memo explicitly denied the creation of any such rights:
This memorandum confers no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship. Only
the Congress, acting through its legislative authority, can confer these rights. It remains for the executive branch, however, to set forth policy for the
exercise of discretion within the framework of the existing law. I have done so here.
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Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June
15, 2012).
While entitlements are not always self-labeled or
created with bright flashing lights, the exercise or restraint of prosecutorial discretion is not traditionally the
sort of governmental action that creates substantive
rights. The DACA Memo did not guarantee any individual immigrant particular benefits, and the DACA Rescission Memo did not curtail DHS’s discretion regarding individual immigration reviews. Therefore, even if
due process could attach to DACA, no de facto entitlements were created by the program itself.
Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ procedural
due process claim to lack merit.
f.

Substantive Due Process

While procedural due process outlines the manner
by which the government may deprive a person of his or
her rights, substantive due process bars the government
from depriving a person of a right altogether. See, e.g.,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167-68 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). If the right being deprived is a “fundamental right,” courts apply strict scrutiny; if the right being
deprived is not fundamental, courts apply rational basis.
Certain rights have been adjudicated formally as
fundamental (right to associate, right to educate one’s
children, right to procreate, right to marry, etc.). E.g.,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-86 (1965).
In determining whether a non-previously-adjudicated
right is fundamental, courts have applied different
approaches—whether the absence of the right would
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make other fundamental rights “less secure,” see id. at
482-83, whether the right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City
of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)), and whether
the right is a basic value “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” see Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
In the instant case, Plaintiffs claim a “denial of fundamental fairness.” See ECF No. 29 at 63-64. However, for the “denial of fundamental fairness” to rise to
the level of a substantive due process violation, it must
be “so egregious” and “so outrageous” as “to shock the
contemporary conscience.” See Manion v. N. Carolina
Med. Bd., 693 F. App’x 178, 181 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8,
850 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)). Plaintiffs believe they have
met this burden by alleging a discriminatory intent in
DACA’s rescission—an allegation unsupported by the
record before this Court.
The rescission of a policy relating to prosecutorial
discretion does not shock the conscience of this Court.
Absent congressional action, the benefits given to Dreamers by DACA were in potential violation of congressional
immigration laws; the only thing that has changed is
that deferred status will expire, and enforcement of immigration laws may recommence in the absence of action
by Congress, which the President has requested. There
is nothing surprising or unfair about policies, laws, or
enforcement thereof changing with an election cycle.
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Furthermore, the election process, and not federal litigation, is the appropriate method for resolving any fairness implicated in DACA’s rescission.
Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ substantive
due process claim to lack merit.
g.

Estoppel

The doctrine of estoppel is traditionally founded in
the principles of fraud as applied in contract law, but
the doctrine may be applied elsewhere in the law as
well. See generally W. Augusta Dev. Corp. v. Giuffrida,
717 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1983) (discussing the outgrowth of the doctrine of estoppel as a claim against the
government). In general, “equitable estoppel is comprised of three basic elements: (1) a voluntary misrepresentation of one party, (2) that is relied on by the other
party, (3) to the other party’s detriment.” Chawla v.
Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 440 F.3d 639,
646 (4th Cir. 2006). In this Circuit, when raising such a
claim against the government, there is a heightened standard for the first element, and an additional showing of
“affirmative misconduct” by the government actors.
See Dawkins v. Witt, 318 F.3d 606, 611 (4th Cir. 2003).
As with Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim, estoppel cannot apply to DACA’s rescission. The rescission of a policy relating to prosecutorial discretion does
not amount to a misrepresentation by the government.
DACA was promulgated with an express disclaimer that
it was not conferring any rights. Nothing in the DACA
Memo or in DACA’s implementation suggested to
Dreamers that the program was permanent, and individuals in the program were aware that their protections
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were subject to renewal every two years. DACA’s rescission lacks any serious injustice—let alone, affirmative misconduct by any of the defendants.
However, while estoppel does not apply to DACA’s
rescission, it potentially would apply to any use for immigration enforcement of the information collected from
Dreamers during DACA registrations. With regard to
this narrow issue, and based on the evidence before it,
the Court finds that the Government promised not to
transfer or use the information gathered from Dreamers for immigration enforcement. See ECF No. 29 at
42-44, 60-61; ECF No. 29-3 at 15-27, 32-41, 52-76, 96-98,
109-13. And now that the government is in possession
of this information, the potential for use or sharing of it
is theoretically possible.
On the one hand, the Government claims that no
changes have been made to the information-sharing policy. However, at oral argument, counsel for the Government was unable to provide any assurance that the
Government would not make changes.
[Mr. Shumate:] The rescission policy that is being
challenged here says nothing about the sharing of information for enforcement purposes. There’s nothing more that the plaintiffs have raised other than a
speculative fear that this might happen in the future.
But DHS has been quite clear and they said on the
FAQ section—
The Court: Are you prepared to say that from representing the defendants that there is no intention of
changing the information-sharing assurances that
were given in connection with DACA?
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Mr. Shumate: No. I’m not making that representation, Your Honor. Even from the beginning, DHS
has been quite clear that this policy on informationsharing can change. . . . But they also I think
take liberties with what that policy is. There has
never been a promise or assurance that that information would never be changed. FAQ 19 quite
clearly says that the information is generally protected and will not be shared for enforcement purposes, but there may be circumstances where it will
be to adjudicate a DACA application or for law enforcement purposes if the individual meets the status
of the test for notice to appear. But also quite
clearly, DHS has said from the start that the information policy—sharing policy can change, but it has
not. So that really should be the end of the debate
about the information-sharing.
Tr. of Mot. Hr’g (Dec. 15, 2017) at 16-17.
The Court disagrees that this “should be the end of
the debate about the information-sharing.” Id. Logic
would dictate that it is possible that the government,
having induced these immigrants to share their personal
information under the guise of immigration protections,
could now use that same information to track and remove them. This potentially would be “affirmative misconduct” by the government, and the Dreamers’ detrimental reliance would be self-evident in the informationsharing itself.
Therefore, while the Government will not be enjoined
from rescinding DACA, given the substantial risk for irreparable harm in using Dreamers’ DACA-provided information, the Court will enjoin the Government from
using information provided by Dreamers through the
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DACA program for enforcement purposes. In the event
that the Government needs to make use of an individual
Dreamer’s information for national security or some
purpose implicating public safety or public interest, the
Government may petition the Court for permission to do
so on a case-by-case basis with in camera review.
IV. CONCLUSION

In concluding this Opinion, the Court notes the recent opinion of Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel, of the Southern
District of California, in which he made observations
that aptly apply to this case. In a case involving a challenge to President Trump’s proposed “border wall,” he
noted that the case was “currently the subject of heated
political debate,” but that in its review of the case, “the
Court cannot and does not consider whether underlying
decisions . . . are politically wise or prudent.” In
re Border Infrastructure Envtl. Litig., No. CV 17-1215
GPC (WVG), 2018 WL 1071702, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 27,
2018). For this proposition, he cited the opinion of his
fellow Indiana native, Chief Justice Roberts, in Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 538 (2012):
“Court[s] are vested with the authority to interpret the
law; we possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation’s elected leaders, who can be
thrown out of office if the people disagree with them.
It is not our job to protect the people from the consequences of their political choices.”
The result of this case is not one that this Court
would choose if it were a member of a different branch
of our government. An overwhelming percentage of
Americans support protections for “Dreamers,” yet it is
not the province of the judiciary to provide legislative or
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executive actions when those entrusted with those responsibilities fail to act. As Justice Gorsuch noted during his confirmation hearing, “a judge who likes every
outcome he reaches is probably a pretty bad judge,
stretching for the policy results he prefers rather than
those the law compels.” 35
This Court does not like the outcome of this case, but
is constrained by its constitutionally limited role to the
result that it has reached. Hopefully, the Congress
and the President will finally get their job done.
Date:

Mar. 5, 2018
/s/

ROGER W. TITUS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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